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INTRODUCTION

By providing a scientific link between the compensatory and

deterrence goals of tort law, the Pigovian theory of externalities' has
had an enormous influence on modem torts scholarship and tort doc2

trine.

The theoretical framework and the accompanying goal of internalizing external costs provide a solution to a question that early torts
theorists were unequipped to answer: How could a liability rule designed to compensate tort victims provide the proper amount of deterrence? As simple as this question may now seem,3 it would have
been hard to answer rigorously before the externality literature appeared, and one searches in vain for an answer in the early torts
theorists such as Holmes.' Further, externality theory provides a reason for distinguishing torts and crimes, because it suggests that criminal penalties should be used only in areas where compensatory damages are unlikely to bring about the desired amount of deterrence.5
1. The literature is enormous, but externality theory is generally traced to Arthur Pigou.
See A.C. PIGOU, Tim ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1952). For some early contributions,
see Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 QJ. ECON. 351 (1958); James M.
Buchanan & W. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371 (1962).
The reader may wonder why we refer to the literature as the "Pigovian theory of
externalities" rather than simply "theory of externalities." We use the word Pigovian because
we want to refer to the state of the externality literature before the contribution of Ronald
Coase, see infra note 6.
2. The influence is apparent. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987).

3. We say it seems simple because the link between compensation and the appropriate
level of deterrence is, at least in simple cases, a settled area of the economic theory of tort
law (and in complicated cases one should find agreement on the theoretical approach). For a
non-technical, introductory discussion of damages and the appropriate level of deterrence or
care-taking, see RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-9
(1982).
4. Holmes has little to say in The Common Law about the link between full compensation and the appropriate level of deterrence or care-taking, probably because it was not a
question that he was interested in answering. In addition, he was writing well before Learned
Hand's opinion stating the Hand formula, and before the externality literature in economics.
However, the following passage suggests that the intuition underlying the Hand formula and
the externality literature was guiding some of his conclusions:
One who diminishes the value of property by intentional damage knows it belongs
to somebody. If he thinks it belongs to himself, he expects whatever harm he may
do to come out of his own pocket. It would be odd if he were to get rid of the
burden by discovering that it belonged to his neighbor.
OLIvER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 97 (1881).
5. Externality theory is used to describe the boundary between private and public
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In spite of its important contributions, the theory of externalities
was criticized by Coase in his article on social cost.6 The problem
for Coase was that the theory, as then understood by many lawyers
and economists, suggested that there was no need for a private liability system. The state could control undesirable behavior by setting appropriate taxes that could take the place of liability rules. This was a
naive solution to Coase because it ignored the importance of incentives. A private liability system took advantage of individual incentives in a way that a centralized system could not. In the extreme
case in which the market operated without friction-the zero transaction costs case-the role of the state could be reduced to the point
where it did not even define legal entitlements, it only enforced valid
contracts. Parties would set appropriate entitlements and arrange
wealth-maximizing contracts between themselves for sharing risks. A
system of Pigovian taxes would not necessarily improve upon this
and could be considerably worse. Under Coase's theory, the role and
significance of the state could not be defined by simply discovering
the sources of externality in an economy.'
This Article presents an alternative critique of externality theory
as a source of normative principles for tort law. We refer to our
critique as the "internalization paradox." The argument runs as follows. The Pigovian goal is to internalize all external costs. The simplest way to do this is to require the injurer to compensate the victim. But this is vulnerable to fraudulent claims. How, for example, is
the injurer to know whether or not the victim is exaggerating the
extent of injury? To turn away fraudulent claims, some administrative
mechanism must be devised to determine the validity of claims, espe-

enforcement in William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4
L LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975).
6. R.H. Cease, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 LL. & ECON. 1 (1960). The article is
known for presenting the "Coase theorem," which states (roughly) that in the absence of obstacles to fully-informed negotiations (transaction costs), bargaining will lead to
wealth-maximizing agreements. However, as Coase made clear in the introduction of the
article, his primary aim was to present a critique of the theory of externalities.
7. It should be noted that since Adam Smith's discussion of the role of the state in
The Wealth of Nations, economists generally have accepted the notion that the state may be
necessary to provide certain goods (public or collective goods) such as defense, that would
otherwise not be provided, or not be provided in sufficient quantity, by the market. The
troublesome part of the theory of externalities, as it was presented by Pigou, is that it could
be read as (and indeed was read as) providing a justification for an expansive regulatory
machinery. Coase's article was not an argument against such a state, but an attempt to
discover the assumptions underlying the claim that a highly interventionist state was necessary
in order to control the problem of externalities.
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cially in cases of unclear causation and novel types of injury. Society
has established courts and arbitration procedures for this purpose. But
the administrative process is itself costly and subject to error, and this
means that some external costs cannot be internalized. The cost to the
plaintiff of invoking the administrative machinery generally cannot be
internalized.' Yet these costs flow from the injurious event as surely
as the injury itself. Further, almost any attempt to reduce error by
improving the evaluation procedure increases the administrative costs
of the system, squeezing out a larger share of potential claims. Efforts
to solve the problem of fraudulent claims run head on into the primary reason for setting up a liability system, and the contradiction
means that a liability system cannot fulfill its function of internalization.
The basic proposition of this Article is that the full internalization principle is an impossible goal. The friction that is required by
the need to determine the validity of claims prevents full internalization.9 External costs can be partially internalized and improvements
in the operational efficiency of a liability system can be sought in
this area, but that is as far as we can go. There are many obstacles to
full internalization in the tort system, such as tax and transfer systems, and imperfect insurance pricing."0 The theoretical literature has
virtually ignored perhaps the most important obstacle: the litigation
process. Efforts to reform the tort system by reforming the litigation
process may have the unintended consequence of exacerbating the
externalization problem.

8. Assume a simple fee shifting rule: all legal costs of successful plaintiffs are shifted
to the defendant. This internalizes the legal costs of successful plaintiffs, but what about
unsuccessful plaintiffs whose claims are valid? The opposite extreme, shifting all costs to the
defendant regardless of the plaintiff's success, would never be adopted as a rule because it

opens the door wide to fraudulent claims. Intermediate cost-shifting rules are subject to the
same criticisms.
9. While we are not aware of any published works that make the general argument of
this Article, there are more detailed studies of the litigation process that suggest a similar
proposition. An example is PHILIPPE NONEr, ADMINISTRATIV
JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND

CHANGE IN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY (1969), which studies the workers' compensation system
in California. Nonet describes the increasing legalization of the workers' compensation system
in California, as it transformed itself from primarily a welfare agency into something close to
a system of courts. We consider this an illustration of the paradox described in this Article.
The capacity to weed out fraudulent claims is an unavoidable component of any compensation system that relies on some "merit" standard, however general.
10. These are two of the three sources of externalization identified by Guido Calabresi
in his seminal work on the tort system. See CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 144-45. The third
source of externalization identified by Calabresi was inadequate information. /I at 145.
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We examine workers' compensation as an illustration of the
internalization paradox. We document the obstacles to full internalization in this area, and find that the litigation process is probably the
most important obstacle to the goal of internalization.
This Article is divided into three sections. The first examines the
theory of internalization and its implications for tort theory. The
second and third examine this theory in light of the history and experience of workers' compensation. We argue that the theory of internalization played an important role in the reform movement that led
to the adoption of the workers' compensation statutes. Finally, we
evaluate workers' compensation as an internalization mechanism.
H. THE INTERNALIZATION PRINCIPLE AND THE TORT SYSTEM

A.

Tort Theory and the Theory of Externalities

1. Externality Theory and the Accident Problem
The implications of the theory of externalities for tort law can be
explained using a simple example. Consider the simplest type of
accident problem: assume that only the injurer's caretaking matters, so
that contributory negligence is not an issue. Assume also that there is
only one potential tortfeasor (or potential injurer). The cost of taking
care is a cost that the potential tortfeasor bears.11 For example, the
cost of looking both ways at an intersection, which is the income
foregone by delaying one's arrival at an important event, is borne by
the potential injurer. The same goes for the cost of having brakes
fixed. The loss to an accident victim in this example is a contingent
cost that the potential injurer bears only if forced to by a liability
rule.
According to the theory of externalities, economically inefficient
decisions result from a divergence between private and social incentives." Social incentives are determined by comparing the "social

11. In the economics of tort law literature, two types of care have been discussed. One,
which is referred to simply as "care," is the instantaneous or momentary level of care. The
other, which is referred to as "activity," is the amount a tortfeasor participates in an activity
that may generate accidents. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence 9 J.
LEGAL STuD. 1 (1980). One of the earlier discussions of this distinction is provided in
RICHARD A. POsNER, ECONOMC ANALYSiS OF LAW 139-41 (2d ed. 1977).
In this section of the text, care can be understood to mean either instantaneous care
or activity. The points made in this section are valid regardless of the definition of care.
However, most of the examples discussed involve instantaneous care.
12. WILLAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THIEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 36-45 (2d ed. 1988) (providing a mathematically rigorous statement of incentive
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benefits" and "social costs" of a given action. The social benefits are
equal to the sum of all of the private benefits generated by an action,
and similarly, the social costs are equal to the sum of private costs.
Consider, for example, a homeowner who values having his garage
painted at $1,000. Suppose the neighbors benefit by $2,000 from the
same action-either because they enjoy looking at the newly painted
garage or because it raises their property values slightly. Then the
social benefits resulting from the homeowner's decision to have his

garage painted sum to $3,000, while the private benefit is only
$1,000.
Private incentives are determined by comparing the private benefits with the private costs of a given action. If certain social costs are
not borne by the decision-maker, then he will have an excessive
incentive to engage in an activity whose net private benefits are posi'tive.13 On the other hand, if some of the social benefits are not enjoyed by the decision-maker, he will have too little incentive to engage in an activity. So in the example of the homeowner who is
deciding whether to have his garage painted, if his private cost is
$500, the net private benefit from having the garage painted is $500.
Since this is less than the net social benefit of $2,500, the homeowner has too little incentive to paint his garage. 4
In the absence of a liability rule, the potential tortfeasor has an
excessive incentive to engage in activities that may give rise to accidents. For example, when crossing an intersection in a car, the potential tortfeasor would compare the benefit of not stopping to look,
which is the money saved by not delaying arrival at an important
event, with the cost of not stopping to look. In the absence of a
liability rule, the cost of not stopping to look would be zero, so the

divergence problem). Social incentives are often referred to as "Pareto Optimality conditions."
If, in equilibrium, the Pareto Optimality conditions hold, then the equilibrium is said to be
Pareto Optimal. An equilibrium is Pareto Optimal if no one's welfare can be improved
without making someone else worse off. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 11-12 (3d e4. 1986) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW].
13. I refer to activities whose net private benefits are positive because these are the
only activities in which the decision-maker will voluntarily engage. Activities whose
net-private benefits are negative will obviously be avoided by the decision-maker

14. This example can be used to provide a simple illustration of Coase's critique of
externality theory. See Coase, supra note 6. We assume that the homeowner does not receive
the benefits enjoyed by his neighbors, and so he has too little incentive to paint his garage.
But this does not dispose of the issue. What prevents the neighbors from paying or "bribing"
the homeowner to paint his garage? The homeowner's lack of incentive can only result from
obstacles that prevent the neighbors from offering the appropriate bribes.
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overwhelming incentive would be to not stop.
A liability rule corrects the incentive problem in the accident
setting by forcing the potential tortfeasor to take into account the
possible loss to the accident victim. Because the potential loss suffered by the victim would be internalized, the private incentive to
engage in accident-generating activity would then be equivalent to
social incentive.
2. Externality Theory and Justifications of Tort Law
Although externality theory has the technical flavor of much of
economics, previous commentators have failed to recognize its generality. Virtually any theory of tort law can be stated in a form that is
entirely consistent with externality theory.
There are two broad categories of justifications of tort law. One
is utilitarian theory.' 5 Posner has noted that economic theory is not
equivalent to utilitarianism. 16 The utilitarian attempts to maximize
happiness, while the economist attempts to maximize society's happiness subject to income constraints. In this sense, an economist may
quite accurately be called a "constrained utilitarian." While happiness
derived from consuming certain items is the only measure taken into
account by utilitarians, the economist measures willingness to pay,
and then only when it is backed up by an ability to pay. Thus, in
asking whether society's welfare is improved if A engages in activity
X, the utilitarian simply asks whether total utility is higher, all other
things equal, f A is allowed to do X. The economist, on the other
hand, asks whether A's willingness to pay to engage in activity X
exceeds the opportunity cost of the resources used. Although the basic
goal, welfare maximization, is the same, the utilitarian and economic
approaches have different practical implications.
Posner is correct in distinguishing utilitarianism from economics,
but the differences are small enough to be pushed into the background, on a general level. The differences Posner points to are important, but as long as they are kept in mind, it does no harm to

15. Though preceded by Cesare Beccaria and others, Jeremy Bentham is usually mentioned as the founder of utilitarianism. For an example of Bentham's theoretical work, see
JEREMY BENT
I, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1948). Today, the field of
utilitarian justifications of tort law is dominated by the law and economics literature. See,
e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW (1987) [hereinafter SHAVEL , ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
16. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-87 (1983) [hereinafter POSNER,
ECONOMICS OF JusTIcE].
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place these two bodies of theory in the same general category. The
large scale similarities are far more noticeable than the differences
Posner has catalogued.
The economic or constrained utilitarian justification of negligence
doctrine is well known,17 and its consistency with externality theory
has been explained."8 The constrained utilitarian would explain the
Hand formula19 as a rule that guarantees that potential tortfeasors
will take care when, and only when, taking care maximizes society's
wealth.2" Thus, if the cost of taking care exceeds the potential loss
to the accident victim, society's wealth would be reduced if the potential injurer took care. Tort law, specifically the Hand formula, does
not require the tortfeasor to take care in this case. This is consistent
with externality theory because the Hand formula, as a liability rule,
has the effect of internalizing the external cost of failing to take care
to those tortfeasors whose caretaking is required if society's wealth is
to be maximized. Of course, the alternative to the Hand test, strict
liability, also internalizes the external costs of failing to take care.
However, a strict liability rule internalizes the costs of accidents
whether or not society's wealth would be maximized by additional
caretaking on the injurer's part. Under a system of strict liability, the
shifting of accident costs to injurers whose caretaking is not socially
desirable has no beneficial effect on society's wealth.
The other broad category of positive theory is made up of Kantian, deontological, or natural law justifications.2 The arguments
were originally stated by a school of German theorists led by
Savigny, 2 and recently have been championed by Charles Fried23

17. The first essentially economic justification of negligence doctrine was provided by
Oliver Wendell Holmes in lecture three of The Common Law, see HOLMES, supra note 4.
The next economic justification of negligence doctrine was Posner's. See Richard A. Posner,
A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 28 (1972). Now, of course, there is a large and
technically complicated literature. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2; SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 15.
18. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
19. The Hand formula defines negligence as a failure to take care where the cost of
taking care is less than the-probability of the accident multiplied by the loss if the accident
occurs. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
20. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW, supra note 12, at 147-51.
21. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 55.
22. See Izhak Englard, Victor Mataja's Liability for Damages From an Economic
Viewpoint: A Centennial to an Ignored Economic Analysis of Tort, 10 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 173, 175-77 (1990) (discussing Friedrich Karl von Savigny's influence on European
19th century jurisprudence).
23. See CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND
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and Ernest Weinrib.24 The Kantians see the negligence rule as a specific application of the more general Kantian rule concerning the
proper amount of freedom permitted by the state: that amount of
freedom that is consistent with an equal right on the part of others to
enjoy their freedom according to general laws.' The more specific
rule stated by Charles Fried is that every individual should have the
fullest freedom to impose the risk of death on others compatible with
an equal right on the part of others to impose the risk of death on
the individual, according to general laws.26
Kant offered his general verbal formula as a solution to a very
old problem known as the "paradox of freedom." 27 The paradox is
this: In a lawless state all men would be free. But then the strong
would control the weak and many would in effect be robbed of their
freedom, so in fact very few would really be free. However, the more
laws we introduce to prevent this outcome, the more power we give
to the state, which restricts the freedom of the individual. In the limit,
very few are free.2
The paradox is observed in tort law. The absence of any rule
assigning liability or constraining the behavior of injurers leads to the
absence of freedom, because we would all then be afraid of being
hurt. We would stay inside our homes instead of venturing out. On
the other hand, very detailed, rigorously enforced controls on potentially injurious behavior produce the same result. The negligence rule,
as envisioned by the Kantian theorists, is a compromise between these

SOCIAL CHOICE 177-91 (1970) [hereinafter FRIED, ANATOMY OF VALUES]; CHARLES FRIED,
RIGHT AND' WRONG 7-17 (1978).
24. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407
(1987); Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 472
(1987); Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, in JUsTICE, RIGHTS,
AND TORT LAW 123 (Michel D. Bayles & Bruce Chapman eds., 1983) [hereinafter Weinrib,
Moral Theory]; Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 485 (1989).
It should be noted that George Fletcher's article on tort law is an important part of
the Kantian tort theory literature. See George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory,
85 HARV. L REV. 537 (1972).
25. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 35-39 (John Ladd
trans., 1965). The provision "according to general laws" is important. Any norm that cannot
be applied generally cannot satisfy the Kantian rule. An example of a norm that cannot be
applied is a rule that I will not play tennis with a player who is not better than me. If
everyone were to follow this rule, no one would ever play tennis. See, e.g., ALAN CARTER,
THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 83 (1989). See generally Sympo-

sium, Kantian Legal Theory, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 421 (1987).
26.
27.

FRIED, ANATOMY OF VALUES, supra note 23, at 185.
See 2 KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEm

44 (5th ed. 1966).

28. Id
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extremes.
Of course, the problem the Kantians were trying to solve is a
moral one, not one of simply trying to strike a balance at the right
amount of potentially injurious behavior.29 Indeed, there is no right
amount in the aggregate of accident-generating behavior under Kantian theory. The theory is concerned with individual compliance with
moral norms, not, unlike the various versions of utilitarianism, the
aggregate amount of "happiness." Fried has argued that the moral
concern in the area of accident law can be framed as a matter of
determining the amount one wishes to draw from a hypothetical aggregate "risk budget." 30 The risk budget is something that is constructed in a hypothetical contract, behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, no one knows what sort of person he or she
will be in real life. We must decide then what is the proper rate at
which an individual can draw from the aggregate risk budget. Society
clearly would not choose zero, since that would mean that no one
could get on with the basics of life. Nor would it choose an infinite
amount, for the same reason. The amount would be a function of the
need. An appropriately pressing need would justify a larger withdrawal from the risk budget. The negligence rule is the formalization of
this implicit contract.
The most important assumption made by the Kantian theorists,
particularly Fried, who is explicit about this, is that we all have similar tastes for risk3 For in the absence of this assumption, there is
little reason to think that every member of society would agree to the
restrictions imposed by negligence doctrine. The important restriction
in this respect is the reasonable man standard, 2 which does not allow the tortfeasor to argue that his individual taste for risk justifies
an extraordinarily large draw from society's risk budget. If one or
more individuals in the hypothetical contract making stage were aware
of this problem and they wanted to impose more risk on others, in
exchange allowing others to impose more risk on them, they would
presumably seek to have such a clause entered into the contract. But
this would be inconsistent with the negligence rule. So the Kantian

29. See generally George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 553 (1987).
30. FRIED, ANATOMY OF VALUES, supra note 23, at 187. For criticism of Fried's
approach from a Kantian perspective, see Weinrib, Moral Theory, supra note 24, at 131-35.
31. FRIED, ANATOMY OF VALUES, supra note 23, at 190.
32.

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToTS § 32,

at 173-93 (5th ed. 1984).
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theory of tort law relies on the assumptions of similar tastes and risk
aversion. It is a weakness of the theory, which is incidentally shared
by Rawls' theory of justice.3 3 Some individuals would prefer to bear
more risk and their presence cannot simply be assumed away. 34
Fried recognizes the problem and addresses it by saying that the
reasonableness standard is required to make the negligence rule administrable. 5 Suppose negligence doctrine allowed an injurer to offer
as a defense that he simply liked to live on the edge and society
ought to get used to it. Besides, he would add, I am willing to let
the rest of society impose extra risk on me in return. This would
clearly contradict the reasonable man standard, and in Fried's view
would make negligence doctrine unadministrable because we would
never be able to distinguish injurers who were telling the truth from
those who had simply figured out a way to beat the system.
The problem with Fried's response is that it places
administrability ahead of the moral problem. Morality requires us to
let the injurer who simply likes to live on the edge go free.
Administrability does not allow us to do this. So a theory that begins
with morality ends up making administrability the overriding concern.
The Kantian argument is so thoroughly blended with utilitarianism at
this stage that it is impossible to save it as an independent justification.
In spite of the weakness in the Kantian arguments, revealed by
the assumption of universal risk aversion, they remain a powerful
source of justification in legal theory because they disconnect the
administrative concerns from the moral concerns and attempt to place
the moral concerns first. As a positive theorv of tort law, there are
weaknesses in the Kantian approach. However, the weaknesses identified here are not as important when viewed as a normative theory.'
Previous writers in this area have seen the theory of externalities
as a special case of the utilitarian approach, and therefore incompatible with Kantian theory.37 However, this view is wrong. The essence
33. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE (1971).
34. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-UtilitarianNotes on Rawls's Theory of
Justice, 70 J. PHIL 245, 251-52 (1973).
35. FRIED, ANATOMY OF VALUES, supra note 23, at 190.
36. Viewed as a normative theory, the Kantian approach is not diminished in any sense

by the fact that its implications are inconsistent with tort doctrine. Further, the strength of the
Kantian approach as a normative theory is that it is capable of defending a moral rule such
as one that recognizes the value of lives that are not producing and will never produce
anything of value to society.
37. For example, Ernest Weinrib asserts that all approaches suggested by "maximizing
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of the externality argument is a notion of violation. External costs are
costs that the injurer generates and imposes on others. But that is
what the Kantian theory, in Fried's terms, says about those who draw
too much from society's risk budget." They draw more than the
proper amount, given their needs, and therefore impose an unjustified
cost on others. 9 The act of drawing too much from the risk budget
can be viewed as an externality that should be internalized just as the
utilitarian would hold that a violation of the Hand formula requires
loss-shifting.
The popular theoretical understanding of externality theory and
tort theories places the externality theory under utilitarianism, as a
special type of utilitarian approach. The externality theory is seen as
providing a set of tools for the utilitarian theorist. However, the better
view of externality theory is that it encompasses utilitarian and Kantian approaches to justify accident law. The concerns of the Kantian
theorist can be discussed just as easily within the externality framework as those of the utilitarian.'
The differences in the use of externality theory under utilitarian
and Kantian approaches are observed in trying to reach specific statements of the compliance requirements. The utilitarian approach yields
specific dollars and cents figures for the amount of the external cost
that should be shifted. In the Hand formula version, it provides a
precise amount of care that should be exercised. In the case of a tort
injury, the amount that should be shifted is the injury loss suffered by
the victim. That is the external cost suffered by the victim. The only
problem in application arises in measuring loss, but at least in theory
there is no ambiguity concerning the amount that should be internal-

theories" are incompatible with corrective justice, and should therefore be rejected as explanations of negligence law. See generally Weinrib, Moral Theory, supra note 24.
38. FRIED, ANATOMY OF VALUEs, supra note 23, at 187-91.

39. Id.
40. The corrective justice theory of Jules Coleman offers another perspective on the
claim that the externality framework is general enough to encompass Kantian and utilitarian
approaches. Coleman's view of corrective justice is that it requires nothing more than the
annulment of unjust gains and losses. See Jules L Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of
Corrective Justice, 67 IND. LJ. 349, 357 (1992). His theory clearly lends support to the
-internalization" suggestions of externality theory.
One of the earliest and perhaps the best example of use of the basic ideas of

externality theory to justify deontological norms is JOHN STUART MIL, ON LiBERTn (1859).
Mill sought to determine the proper scope of government intervention by starting with two
principles: that the state should not attempt to regulate an individual's "self-regarding" behavior in order to make that individual better off, and that the state may interfere or regulate

when an individual's behavior affects others directly.
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ized. Thus, if the victim suffers an unambiguous $200 loss as a result
of an injury, externality theory requires that the injurer compensate
the victim precisely that amount.
Under a Kantian approach, externality theory does not clearly tell
us how much should be shifted from the victim to the injurer, or how
much care should be exercised by the potential injurer. The Kantian/Pigovian approach is incapable of telling us this for several reasons. First, unless we assume that all individuals have similar tastes
for risk, the Kantian/Pigovian approach goes no further than simply
identifying a violation and counseling us to adopt a rule that will
prevent such a violation. It can go no further because if people have
different tastes for risk, the amount that should be shifted will depend
on the preferences of the individual tortfeasor. A second and more
general reason that the Kantian/Pigovian approach is not very useful
at a practical level is that it does not yield an explicit formula which
allows us to identify when someone has drawn too much from the
risk budget. We could use the Hand formula, arguing that it must
approximate whatever the Kantian theorist has in mind, but the theory
itself does not generate a formula.
The inability of the Kantian approach to generate a mathematical
rule such as the Hand formula is a serious weakness because it means
that the theory is incapable of telling us what level of internalization
is appropriate. For example, it is difficult to use the Kantian approach
to criticize the levels of tort compensation. The inability of the theory
to provide a rigorous justification of a mathematical internalization
rule also means that the theory probably cannot, with a fair degree of
rigor, be used to make a principled choice between strict liability and
negligence. This problem has been revealed in the literature already.
The two most prominent Kantian theorists, Charles Fried and Richard
Epstein (in his earlier writings), part ways when it comes to the
choice between strict liability and negligence.4 1 Fried uses Kantian
arguments to provide an elaborate justification of negligence doctrine.
Epstein sees the theory as providing a justification for strict liability.
Yet the reason for the different positions taken by these theorists is
very hard to understand precisely because the theory has not been
presented in a suitably rigorous form. This criticism does not apply to
utilitarian approaches because the assumptions that would lead one

41. Compare Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973), with FRIED, ANATOMY OF VALUES, supra note 23. This point is noted in POSNER,
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 55.
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theorist to choose strict liability over negligence can be stated clearly.
Because of the weaknesses in the Kantian framework, this Article
will adopt the traditional utilitarian/Pigovian approach. However, the
point of the discussion in this section is not to uncover weaknesses in
the Kantian justifications of tort law, but to demonstrate the generality
of the externality framework.
3. The Utilitarian/Pigovian Framework
Much of the economic theory of tort law falls under what could
be called a utilitarian/Pigovian framework. There are two branches
within this subdivision. One is positive theory, which has been promoted in the work of Richard Posner and William Landes.42 The
theory, which is exemplified by the work of Guido
other is normative
43
Calabresi.
Positive theory is concerned largely with demonstrating that the
doctrinal rules can be justified on efficiency grounds, an approach
which has been referred to as "doctrinal efficiency." 44 The characteristic feature of the doctrinal efficiency approach is that it ignores administrative costs in determining efficient rules.4 Thus, under the
approach of the positive theorists, a rule is efficient if it can be
shown to minimize Total Costs = Accident Costs + Accident
Avoidance Costs."6 The Hand formula is doctrinally efficient because
42. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2 and the literature cited therein.
43. See CALABRESI, supra note 2. The normative theory literature is probably larger than
the positive theory literature, especially if one counts all of the articles written by economists
that offer models of optimal tort systems (e.g., optimal tort damages). Gordon Tullock is
responsible for some of the rare contributions to the reform literature that combine theoretical
sophistication with knowledge of the legal system. See GORDON TULLOCM, THE LOOic OF
THE LAW (1971); GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL: THE PURE THEORY OF LEGAL
PROCEDURE (1980) [hereinafter TuLLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL].
44. Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 111, 148 (1991) [hereinafter, Hylton, Economic Theory].
45. For example, in determining whether the negligence rule is efficient, the doctrinal
efficiency approach ignores litigation costs. The Hand formula is consistent with this approach. Id. at 147. If litigation costs were taken into account, then the injurer's burden of
precaution, B, should be compared to the expected loss, PL, plus the expected cost of
litigation, C. For further discussion, see id; Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal
Error Under Negligence, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 433 (1990) [hereinafter Hylton, Costly Litigation]. On the influence of litigation costs on welfare under a liability system, see Janusz A.
Ordover, Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 243
(1978); Janusz A. Ordover, On the Consequences of Costly Litigation in the Model of Single
Activity Accidents: Some New Results, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1981); A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigationfor the Level of Liability, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1988); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
46. See, e.g., John P. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
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it is the rule that minimizes this sum.
The doctrinal efficiency approach is to be contrasted with a
different approach which we refer to as "operational efficiency." Operational efficiency takes administrative and other costs into account
in determining an efficient legal rule. Thus, an operationally efficient,
rule minimizes Total Cost = Accident Cost - Accident Avoidance
Cost + Administrative Costs. Calabresi was explicit in stating this as
the goal of an operationally efficient tort system.4 7
The distinction between the two approaches is important because
a rule that is doctrinally efficient may not be operationally efficient
and vice versa. The classic example is the Hand formula for negligence. Brown,4 8 Landes and Posner, 9 and others have demonstrated
that the Hand formula is doctrinally efficient. But they have not
shown it to be operationally efficient. A careful examination reveals
that the Hand formula is not operationally efficient, as long as administrative costs are positive." Thus, even the most basic implication of the doctrinal efficiency school is called into question when the
goal is shifted to operational efficiency.
Not surprisingly, the doctrinal efficiency approach is predominant
in the tort theory literature because most of the literature aims to
explain tort doctrine. The literature has a long history beginning probably with Holmes' discussion of tort law in lectures three and four of
The Common Law.51 Holmes argued that much of tort doctrine could
be explained by using cost benefit arguments. The cost benefit arguments have been expanded upon and brought under the mantle of
economic theory by Landes and Posner, and other theorists. 52
The operational efficiency literature is of fairly recent origin and
its best known work is Guido Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents.53
The operational efficiency theorists have generally criticized the tort
system, with a view toward reform.' They have been less concerned
with the doctrines of tort law than with empirical evidence of its
performance on deterrence or compensation grounds.

STUD. 323, 324-26 (1973).
47. See CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 28-29.
48. See Brown, supra note 46, at 332-47.
49. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 85-103.
50. Hylton, Costly Litigation, supra note 45, at 444-45.
51. See HOLMES, supra note 4.
52. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 40-41, 64-69.
53. See CALABRESI, supra note 2.
54. Id at 1-15; TUILOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL, supra note 43, at 34-48.
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Although this Article is in the tradition of Calabresi and other
theorists who have examined operational efficiency, we will take no
position on whether operational efficiency or doctrinal efficiency
should be the approach of tort theorists. One strong argument for
doctrinal efficiency is that the administrative costs of the tort system
are not fixed and may change at any moment. If operational efficiency is the goal, then the tort rules would have to be changed every
time the administrative costs of using the tort system were changed.
On the other hand, there is a strong argument for making operational
efficiency the main goal. When there is a conflict between operational
and doctrinal efficiency, why should we be concerned with doctrinal
efficiency? The ultimate goal, after all, is to deter reckless or careless
behavior that may cause accidents. Any approach that deviates from
this goal threatens to defend or to generate a set of useless rules.
B.

Calabresi's Critique of the Tort System: A Reexamination

Since the major work in the vein of this Article is Calabresi's
The Costs of Accidents, we will use it as a backdrop for some of our
arguments concerning tort theory. Calabresi identified three categories
of social cost: primary, secondary, and tertiary.55 Primary costs are
accident costs and avoidance costs.56 The positive theory literature
examines this problem only. Recall that the Hand formula is the most
basic implication of a simple model which attempts to minimize the
sum of accident and avoidance costs.57 Secondary costs in
Calabresi's framework result from inadequate risk spreading.5" Thus,
Calabresi is willing to sacrifice additional primary costs if it will
generate a greater saving in secondary costs. For example, Calabresi
would be willing to deviate from the Hand rule if its result is to
leave accident costs on people who are poor, and therefore unable to
purchase insurance in order to shift away the risk of loss. Tertiary
costs are the administrative costs of running the tort system. 9 Again
Calabresi's argument suggests that we should be willing to sacrifice
primary and secondary costs if it will lead to greater savings in tertiary costs. Thus, if a rule of no liability reduces tertiary costs by an
amount that more than compensates for the increase in primary and

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 26-29.
Id at 26-27.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
CALABRESi, supra note 2, at 27-28.
Id at 28.
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secondary costs, Calabresi would recommend this rule.' Calabresi
set out as the goal of tort law the minimization of the sum of primary, secondary, and tertiary costs."
Our approach differs from Calabresi's'in two respects. First, we
have generally ignored the secondary or risk spreading function of
tort rules emphasized by Calabresi. We have done this for two reasons. One is that with insurance available, there seems to be little
practical reason for aiming to fashion liability rules as if insurance
were not available. As Holmes pointed out more than 100 years ago,
the private insurance market is more efficient in reallocating risk than
is the court system. 2 Although we recognize the general validity of
taking secondary costs into account in considering the welfare arguments for various liability rules, we think it is unlikely that a stable
set of recommendations can come from this source. Private arrangements can undermine any attempt to use liability rules to reallocate
risk.63 The second reason, which is specific to this study, is that
workers' compensation involves an ongoing contractual relationship
between the employer and employee. There is every incentive within
that relationship to use the wage contract and other provisions to

60. One important proposition that has come out of the theoretical literature is that this
problem is possible. Because private and social incentives to litigate are not the same,
plaintiffs may bring suit in areas in which a no liability rule would be socially desirable. For
proof of this general proposition, see Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive
to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 334-38 (1982). For refinements of the proposition, see Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15
L LEGAL STUD. 371, 372 (1986) (Shavell's argument shows the externality created by litigation costs and is undisturbed by Menell's argument); Peter S. Menell, A Note on Private
Versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System, 12 L LEGAL STUD. 41 (1983);
Susan Rose-Ackerman & Mark Geistfeld, The Divergence Between Social and Private Incentives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell Menell and Kaplow, 16 L LEGAL STUD. 483, 484
(1987) (explaining that by shifting to the British rule, the Menell-Kaplow result holds in general and is not a special case).
For discussion of the implications of the Coase theorem for Shavell's argument, see
Hylton, Economic Theory, supra note 41, at 120-26 (two sources of inefficiency lie below the
claim that suit may be inefficient because the cost of bringing it "exceeds the net benefits
from the deterrence provided by the threat of suit," and the suit may be inefficient "because
potential plaintiffs are unable to identify those potential defendants who will find it inefficient
to bring suit").
61. See CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 26-29.
62. See HOLMES, supra note 4, at 96, 199-201.
63. Consider for example the relationship between a heart surgeon and her patient. A
liability rule requiring the heart surgeon to pay for any injury to the patient would lead the
surgeon to purchase liability insurance. If the patient's demand for her services were not very
responsive to price, as might be the case with heart surgeons, the doctor could probably pass
the full cost of the insurance policy to the patient through charging higher fees.
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spread risk optimally.' Hence, we will focus on incentive considerations, restricting our attention to primary and secondary costs.
The second and more important sense in which our approach
differs from Calabresi's is the treatment of primary and tertiary costs.
It is confusing to put primary and tertiary costs in different categories
because they are interdependent. Calabresi's theoretical framework is
flawed to the extent that it does not take into account the interdepenYence of the categories of social cost, especially primary and tertiary
costs.6' The framework suggests that these categories can be examined independently when in fact they cannot. Primary and tertiary
costs are interdependent in some obvious senses. One typical component of tertiary costs is the plaintiff's cost of bringing a tort claim.
However, if the cost of bringing suit is made sufficiently high, it will
choke off all tort claims. There would then be no disincentive to
careless behavior, so that primary costs would increase dramatically as
well. Alternatively, if the cost to the defendant of defending himself
against a claim were trebled, this would increase the cost of careless
behavior and reduce injuries to some extent. Thus, our analysis differs
from Calabresi's by taking explicitly into account the interaction
between administrative and primary costs.
Calabresi based his analysis of the tort system squarely on the
theory of externalities.' He criticized the tort system for failing to
shift accident costs to the important sources of injury.67 In this
sense, his work was more in the spirit of Fleming James than Oliver
Wendell Holmes.6" Calabresi preferred liability rules that performed
the function of shifting costs, such as strict liability, and would concentrate accident costs on enterprises that were capable of insuring
themselves and passing part of the cost to consumers through charging higher prices for their goods.
Calabresi argued that the tort system, specifically the fault system, was inadequate as a mechanism for internalizing the costs of

64. For example, the workers may accept a lower wage in exchange for
employer-financed health or disability insurance. If transaction costs do not prevent bargaining,

all of the desired risk spreading will take place through the employipent contract.
65. This is not to say that Calabresi himself was guilty of this mistake. The interdependence problem is noted in several areas of his book. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 2, at
143-44.
66. See, e.g., Id at 68-77, 144-50.
67. Id at 68-70.

68. For discussion of Fleming James's scholarship and its impact on tort law, see
George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 465-83 (1985).
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accident-generating activity.' He identified three major sources of
externalization. One is imperfect insurance pricing.7" Actuarially-fair
insurance prices should equal the discounted expected value of the
claim against the insurer, and in theory this equality should hold at
all times." The ideal insurance company would require its customers
to wear risk meters that would tell it at every moment how much risk
was being generated and would vary the price of insuraice accordingly. By varying the price, the insurer would not only ensure that the
price was actuarially fair, so that it would not lose money on an
individual claim, but would also give the insured the appropriate
incentive to avoid causing injury. The insured, instead of comparing
the change in expected liability caused by an incremental adjustment
in risky behavior, would compare the change in the price of insurance
caused by the adjustment. In an actuarially fair market, however,
these amounts would be the same, so that actuarially fair insurance
pricing perfectly internalizes expected external costs. Of course, no
insurance arrangement works this well. 2 Insurance prices do not at
all times accurately reflect risk, and categories for risk rating purposes
are not as precise as they could be drawn. The imperfections have the
effect of externalizing accident costs. For example, the costs of particularly bad drivers below twenty years old are externalized under the
insurance classifications to all drivers below twenty. As a result, the
bad drivers are not given the proper signals for caretaking by the
insurance market.
The second reason the tort system fails to internalize external
69. CALABREsI, supra note 2, at 244.
70. Id at 246-49.
71. See SHAVEIL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 15, at 202-03. This proposition
assumes the insurer can monitor the insured's risk creating activities. It also assumes that the
insurer incurs no administrative costs. If the insurer cannot costlessly monitor risky activities,
then prices will not equal expected claims. On the economics of insurance pricing when the
insured party can influence the risk of a claim, see Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and
Insurance, 93 QJ. ECON. 541 (1979).
72. This should be clear for the reasons stated supra note 71. Administrative costs
prevent insurers from setting prices at the actuarially fair level. Insurers cannot monitor the
risk creating activities of the insured, which gives rise to the problem of "moral hazard (i.e.,
of insured parties having inadequate incentives to take care to avoid an accident). Insurers
cannot costlessly categorize risks, which gives rise to the "adverse selection7 problem (i.e.,

the problem of low risk parties opting out of the insurance market). For a survey of the
literature, see KARL H. BORCH, ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE (Knut K. Aase & Agnar Sandmo

eds., 1990); on adverse selection, see Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 QJ.
EcoN. 629 (1976); Charles Wilson, A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information, 16 J. ECON. THEORY 167, 187-202 (1977).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 3
128

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 21:109

costs is imperfect information." Calabresi argued that other things
being equal, liability should be placed on the party best able to recognize a relationship between caretaking and costs, and to use this
information to reduce accidents.74 In the workers' compensation setting, this argued for the strict liability rules adopted by statute in
every state, because in Calabresi's view, these rules shifted the injury
costs to the party best able to control them. The worker was too
ill-informed on the likelihood of an accident to be able to control
accidents through his own behavior. Placing liability on the employer
gave the employer the incentive to control the cost or to inform the
worker how to control accident costs.
The third reason the tort system, fails to internalize costs is the
tax and transfer system.75 If the social security system, for example,
compensates someone whose disability was caused by an accident,
that person may choose not to seek compensation through the courts.
The "collateral source rule"76 seems to hold this incentive in place,
but there are two problems with this answer. One is that someone
who has received compensation from a collateral source may simply
decide not to seek compensation from the injurer even if an award is
likely.' Second, some states have passed statutes preventing those
who collect from government insurance funds to take advantage of
the collateral source rule.7" Social security disability payments are a

73. See CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 244-46.
74. Id
75. Id. at 246.
76. The collateral source rule holds that the tortfeasor is not entitled to a credit for
payments or benefits received by the injured party from independent sources. See, e.g., Smith
v. United States, 587 F.2d 1013, 1015 (3rd Cir. 1978); Tebo v. Havlik, 343 N.W.2d 181,
186-87 (Mich. 1984). For a general discussion, see Daena A. Goldsmith, A Survey of the
CollateralSource Rule: The Effects of Tort Reform and Impact of Multistate Litigation, 53 J.
AIR L. & COM. 799 (1988).
77. Why? Because seeking a damage award is time consuming and the victim may
prefer not to devote his or her time to it. In other words, for the victim to have an incentive
to sue, the award must exceed the cost of litigating and the opportunity cost of the victim's
time. Alternatively, the victim may be afraid of some sort of retaliation from the tortfeasor if
he brings suit.
78. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 787-88 (5th ed.
1990); see also Jerry J. Phillips, Comments of the Report of the Governor's Commission on
Tort and Liability Insurance Reform, 53 TENN. L. REV 679 (1986); Linda J. Gobis, Note,
Lambert v. Wrensch: Another Step Toward Abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule in
Wisconsin, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 857; L. Timothy Perrin, Comment, The CollateralSource Rule
in Texas: Its Impending Demise and a Proposed Modification, 18 TMX. TECH. L. REV. 961
(1987); Julie A. Schafer, Note, The Constitutionality of Offsetting Collateral Benefits Under
Ohio Revised Code Section 231Z45., 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 587 (1992).
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source of externalization because they essentially allow tortfeasors to
shift the costs of accidents to the public at large.
We question below whether insurance pricing presents the obstacle to internalization that Calabresi thought that it did. Our reason is
based simply on a reliance or trust in market incentives in an insurance arrangement. The insurance company need not control all risky
behavior through pricing. It may make direct requests to the insured
to change its behavior in some way, offering in exchange to reduce
the price, or threatening not to compensate if an accident should occur, or not to renew the policy. There are many instruments available
to the insurer, and we should not expect to see price alone (or, equivalently, risk categorization) used to regulate the behavior of the insured. The insurance company has incentives to use the cheapest
method of controlling or regulating the behavior of the insured. Using
insurance pricing alone to control risky behavior, we argue, may have
harmful effects. We think there needs to be a great deal of evidence
to overcome the presumption that the parties to an insurance contract
have every incentive to find ways to reduce accident claims that
could be avoided at low cost. And in our view, there is simply not
enough evidence.
We also argue that Calabresi failed to mention perhaps the most
important source of externalization: the litigation process. This is
more than just a minor oversight, because the problem stands in the
way of the sort of smooth cost shifting that he envisioned under a
system which made greater use of strict liability rules. The litigation
process is costly, and therefore effectively bars all claims that are not
great enough to cover the plaintiff's cost of litigating. In addition,
liability rules that make compensation easier to obtain also increase
the stakes of litigation, further driving up the costs. The result is that
efforts such as those proposed by Calabresi to reduce errors and to
improve the likelihood of recovery against certain types of injurers
drive up the administrative costs of the system, and may therefore
shut out a larger share of claims. Without having to worry about
these claims, the tortfeasor has little incentive to avoid accidents.
C.

The Internalization Paradox

Our major criticism of Calabresi's argument is a general criticism
of the internalization principle emphasized originally by Pigou. 79 The

79. See PIGoU, supra note 1.
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criticism can be stated in the form of a proposition which we call the
internalization paradox. The paradox is this: Any effort to internalize
accident costs will have to be accompanied by a method of distinguishing fraudulent claims. But any effort to sift out fraudulent claims
will be administratively costly, and part of the administrative cost will
be borne by victims who seek compensation through the tort system.
Thus, victims whose claims are too small to cover the portion of the
administrative cost that must be borne by the victim will effectively
be barred from the tort system.8" Further, the administrative costs
borne by victims will generally not be shifted in full to injurers, so
that those victims who seek compensation through the tort system
will not have their costs shifted in full to injurers.
There is more to the paradox. Almost any rule which improves
the tort system as an internalization mechanism by reducing the frequency of error, or simply increasing the likelihood of recovery, will
probably lead to an increase in the administrative costs of the system,
and as a result, a reduction in the number of claims that it can efficiently process. In other words, improvements in internalization are
likely to be achieved at the cost of shrinking the tort system by reducing the number of accident victims who effectively have access to
it. We provide a largely intuitive argument for this claim below.
The need to separate out fraudulent claims generates administrative costs. By administrative costs, we mean the costs to the plaintiff
and the defendant of litigating their claims, and the costs to the state
of the resources devoted to operating the court system. The largest
component in the cost of litigating is the attorney's fee,"1 which will
be positive even if the parties settle the dispute. The cost of litigating
also includes fees for experts and court filing fees. The cost also
includes the opportunity cost of taking time away from other pursuits
to manage a lawsuit, either as a plaintiff or as a defendant. Except
for the costs borne by the state or the public in providing a court
system, the costs detailed above are private costs. Let CP represent the
private cost to the plaintiff of litigating and let Cd represent the private cost to the defendant of litigating.

80. For a mathematical demonstration in a model of strict liability, see Keith N. Hylton,
The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence,
10 INT'L REV. L & ECON. 161 (1990) [hereinafter Hylton, Influence of Litigation Costs].
81. See JAMES S. KAKAflK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN
TORT LITIGATION 37-44 (1986) (detailing components of plaintiff's legal expenses); David M.
Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 U.C.LA. L REV. 72 (1983) (analyzing
litigation costs from conducted survey).
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Suit will be brought by a rational plaintiff if, and only if, the
expected award exceeds the plaintiff's cost of litigating. Let EAp be
the expected award from the perspective of the plaintiff.' Let EAd
be the expected award from the defendant's perspective. The net
expected award to the plaintiff is EAp - Cp. The expected cost (or
expected total liability) to the defendant is EAd + Cd. The plaintiff
will have an incentive to bring suit only if the net expected award is
positive, i.e., EAp is greater than Cp.
The first statement of the internalization paradox is easily established. Because litigation is costly, all victims for whom the expected
award falls below the plaintiff's cost of litigating (EAp - Cp<O) will
be effectively barred from the courts.
The second statement is a virtually unavoidable result of an
administratively costly procedure: unless the plaintiff's litigation costs
are shifted in full to the injurer, even those victims who seek compensation through the tort system will not have all of their costs
internalized to the injurer. They will be forced to bear the cost of
litigating, which is as much a result of the injurer's behavior as the
injury that led the victim to bring suit. One possible solution may be
to shift litigation expenses to the defendant. But this is not enough
because litigation expenses include some virtually unmeasurable costs,
such as the time that a plaintiff must put into developing his claim.
How does one compensate for the risk of losing a suit that turns out
to be successful? There will inevitably be costs that the system will
not be able to measure accurately and shift from the victim to the
injurer in a tort suit. Further, what about the tort victims who lose
their suits? If the claim was fraudulent, then the resulting loss is a
desirable result. But what about those victims who lose because of an
error on the court's part? They are saddled with legal expenses and
the economic loss due to injury that led them to sue in the first
place.
The third statement of the paradox is that any effort to reduce
courtroom error will increase administrative costs, and therefore shut
out a larger number of potential plaintiffs. The typical approach to
reducing courtroom error involves a procedural change. For example,
the rule against hearsay evidence, 3 or the more basic rule excluding

82. The expected award is equal to the probability of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
multiplied by the judgment.
83. See, eg., FED. R. EVID. 801.
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prejudicial evidence," are methods of reducing the likelihood of
courtroom error. To the extent that such procedural changes require
more costly methods of presenting a claim, they reduce the number
of claims that can reach the court. Restrictions on the kinds of arguments or evidence that a plaintiff can use in court effectively increases the cost of litigating because the plaintiff has an incentive to use
only evidence that increases the probability of recovery more than the
cost of presenting the evidence.
The fourth and final statement is that an effort to increase the
likelihood of recovery, such as shifting from the negligence rule to
strict liability, may lead to an increase in administrative costs and a
reduction in the number of claims that have access to the system.
This should be understood to be a weaker claim than the preceding
three. It requires a somewhat more detailed justification.
In litigation, the plaintiff makes expenditures with a view toward
maximizing the net award. 5 He therefore trades off increases in the
cost of litigating for increases in the expected award. The plaintiff has
an incentive to keep spending money in litigation as long as the
expenditure increases the expected award more than the cost of litigating. Suppose then that the first dollar of expenditure increases the
plaintiff's expected award by $10. The increase in expenditure is, of
course, $1. Since the net award increases by $9, the plaintiff will
have an incentive to spend the first dollar. It seems reasonable to
assume that the amount that additional expenditure on litigation raises
the plaintiff's expected award falls as the litigation expenditure increases. This is simply the principle of diminishing returns, 6 which
is as likely to apply in the litigation process as in any productive activity. If the principle of diminishing returns holds in this situation,
then the plaintiff will continue spending on litigation until the increase in the plaintiff's expected award just equals the increase in the
cost of litigating. Let dEA,/dCp represent the increase in the expected
award that results from one additional dollar of litigation expenditure;

84. See, e.g., FED. R. EViD. 403.
85. See, e.g., John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 157 (1989).

86. The principle can be stated as follows: If in a productive activity requiring several
inputs, one input is increased while the others are held fixed, the resulting increase in output
will fall as more and more unrestricted input is added. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 271-74 (2d ed. 1980); see also Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and
the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REv. 363, 369-70, 424-29 (1984) (explaining a positive
economic theory of the role of proximate cause in negligence law).
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then the principle of diminishing returns implies that the plaintiff will
continue spending on litigation until dEA/dCp is equal to $1.
The defendant will aim to minimize total liability which requires
trading off decreases in the expected judgment, EAd, with increases in
the defendant's litigation expenditure, Cd. The principle of diminishing
returns should hold in this case also, so that the defendant will keep
spending on litigation until the change in the expected award falls to
$1.
Almost any effort to improve the tort system as an internalization mechanism will (or should) have the effect of increasing the
amount that a slight increase in litigation expenditure adds to the
plaintiff's expected award. That is, adoption of a rule that increases
the likelihood of recovery should increase the "productivity" of an
additional dollar of litigation expenditure on the part of the plaintiff.
Thus, after adoption of the new rule, the first dollar of expenditure
increases the expected recovery by $20, whereas before the rule the
first dollar of expenditure increased expected recovery by only $10. If
this "productivity effect" holds at all levels of expenditure, then adoption of a rule that increases the likelihood of recovery will also increase the plaintiff's total expenditure on litigation. A similar argument holds for the defendant's incentive to invest more into litigation.
Any increase in the plaintiff's likelihood of recovery will increase the
stakes for the defendant, causing him to spend more. If the parties are
forced to match each other's litigation expenditures, the result will be
a higher level of cost for both parties. Figure 1 illustrates the
plaintiff's incentive to invest in litigation before and after the legal
innovation.
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$1

dEA,/dC p after innovation
dEA,/dC p before innovation
Cp

FIGURE

1

However, an increase in the plaintiff's cost of litigating will effectively bar claims that do not satisfy the threshold requirement that the
expected award exceed the plaintiff's cost of litigating, i.e., EAP > CP.
This raises the question: Will a larger number of claims be effectively
barred if the cost of litigating rises after a change in the liability
rule? Only if the expected award does not rise by at least as much as
the increase in the plaintiff's cost of litigating. But there is no guarantee that the expected award will rise by at least as much as the
increase in the plaintiff's cost of litigating, because the defendant's
expenditures are devoted to reducing the expected award. It can be
demonstrated that if the plaintiff is unaware of or underestimates the
extent of the defendant's response, the plaintiff's additional litigation
expenditures may exceed the increase in the expected award.
Our claim is that because of rent-seeking expenditures by both
parties, the increase in the expected award following a shift in the
liability rule may not cover the plaintiff's additional litigation expenses. A rigorous way of stating the argument is as follows. Let the
plaintiff's expected award be a function of the amount invested in
litigation by both parties, so that EAP = F(CP, Cd). Similarly, let the
defendant's expected award be a function of litigation expenditures,
EAd = G(CP, Cd). Let the increase in the expected award caused by a
$1 increase in CP, holding Cd fixed, be given by F, > a, and let the
increase in the expected award caused by a $1 increase in Cd, holding
Cp fixed, be given by F 2 < 0. The increase in the expected award
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caused by an increase in the plaintiff's litigation expenditures is then:
dEA/dCp = F + F2(dC/dCp). If the plaintiff is unaware of the
defendant's response, and dC/*dCp > 0,87 he will overestimate the
productivity of investment in litigation. Similarly, the decrease in the
expected award caused by a small increase in defensive expenditures
by the defendant is dEA/dCd = Gl(dCpdCd) + G2. Thus, if the defendant fails to take the plaintiff's response into account, she will
overestimate the impact of her defensive expenditures. The result will
be a rise in litigation expenditures without an offsetting rise in the
expected award. In game theory terminology, we have demonstrated
that if parties adopt "Nash" strategies,"8 the increase in the equilibrium level of litigation expenditures in response to an increase in the
probability of an award may exceed the increase in the expected
award itself.8 9
This completes our argument for the internalization paradox. We
do not think that all parts of this proposition hold in all cases, particularly the last claim. We have argued that under certain conditions an
effort to improve the tort system as an internalization mechanism will,

87. It can be demonstrated that when dCd/dC. is positive, the cross partial derivative F,2
is positive and F,, is negative. Both of these assumptions are intuitively plausible. That F11 is

negative follows from the assumption of diminishing returns. F12 being positive is an implication of the diminishing returns assumption. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
88. In this context, "Nash" strategies implies that the litigants determine their level
assuming that the other litigant maintains his current level of litigation expenditure. See
generally ERIc RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
32-41 (1989).

89. There are a number of issues that are not appropriate for full consideration in this
forum, but should at least be mentioned. First, there is a possibility that there will be several
Nash equilibria. However, the basic incentive problem that generates our conclusion remains
even in this case. Second, there are other equilibria. One set of equilibria are the Stackelberg
equilibria (two of them) in which one party spends less and the other spends more than in
the Nash equilibrium. These equilibria are generated by assuming that one party is fully
aware of the other's reaction to his increase in litigation expenditures. Another equilibrium is
generated by assuming that both parties know each other's responses to increased litigation
expenditure. In this equilibrium, the parties accurately assess the private marginal benefit of
an increase in litigation expenditure, and therefore spend less than in the Nash equilibrium.
Readers familiar with the Coumot-Nash game will find it strange that the parties
spend less on litigation when they are aware of each other's responses, because in the standard story of the game, awareness of responses leads to excessive outpuL The reason is that
consideration of the responses acts as a subsidy to production in the traditional Cournot-Nash
game, while it acts as a tax on litigation expenditure in the game discussed in the text. On
the details of the Cournot-Nash game, see MICHAEL INTRIucGATOR, MATHEMATICAL OPTIMIZATION AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1971). For an explanation of Stackelberg gaming behavior, see
KALMAN J. CoHEN & RICHARD M. CYERT, THEORY OF THE FIRM: RESOURCE ALLOCATION
IN A MARKEr ECONOMY 240-43 (2d ed. 1975).
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once litigant behavior is adequately taken into account, have the effect of driving up administrative costs and making courts inaccessible
to a larger number of potential plaintiffs.
In the remainder of this Article we examine the United States
workers' compensation system in light of the theory presented in this
section. In particular, we focus on its success as an internalizing
mechanism.
I.

TH

INTERNALIZATION PRINCIPLE AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION

A.

Emergence of Workers' Compensation

The long parade of socio-legal reforms that followed on the
heels of the new industrial age included as a relatively early development the introduction of workers' compensation arrangements. The
origins of the idea of assured compensation for workers injured on
the job can be found in Imperial Germany.9" A series of laws passed
between 1883 and 1889 offered disabled workers a solution more
reliable than existing remedies established under civil code or common law regimes.9' The most important were the Sickness Insurance
Law of 1883 and the Accident Insurance Law of 1884.' The Sickness law required employers and employees to contribute to a fund
that would be used to compensate workers who were disabled, as the
result of an injury on the job, for thirteen weeks or less." The Accident law established a fund that covered employees who were disabled for longer than thirteen weeks.' Only employers were required

90. See 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.10 (1991);

Paul R. Gurtler, Comment, The Workers' Compensation Principle: A Historical Abstract of
the Nature of Workers' Compensation, 9 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 285, 288-90 (1989).

91. See Keneim E. Digby, Recent European Legislation with Regard to Compensation
for Industrial Accidents, 17 YALE LJ. 485, 487-88 (1908); Arthur Larson, The Nature and
Origins of Worlnen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 221-31 (1952); J.E. Rhodes II,

The Inception of Worlnen's Compensation in the United States, 11 ME. L. REV. 35, 38-39
(1917).
92. See Digby, supra note 91, at 488-89; P. Tecumseh Sherman, Can the German

Workmen's Insurance Law Be Adapted to American Conditions?, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 67,
68-70 (1912) [hereinafter Sherman, German Workmen's Insurance Law]; P. Tecumsch
Sherman, The Jurisprudenceof the Workmen's Compensation Laws, 63 U. PA. L. REV. 823,
856-60 (1915) [hereinafter Sherman, Workmen's Compensation].
93. Sherman, German Workmen's Insurance Law, supra note 92, at 69; Sherman,
Workmen's Compensation, supra note 92, at 856-57.
94. Sherman, German Worlanen's Insurance Law, supra note 92, at 69.
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to contribute to the Accident fund.95 Both funds offered no-fault

support for disabled workers."
Because the vast majority of worksite injuries were not serious,
the Sickness fund turned out to be the most important," paying out
on a yearly basis more than twice the amount distributed by the
Accident fund.9 Since in most cases there was no inquiry into fault
on the worker's part, the German scheme effectively severed any
connection between the risk characteristics of the employer's worksite
and the "tax" levied upon the employer and employees at a given
worksite. Employer contributions to the Accident fund did increase
with the risk of injury." But the Accident fund covered a relatively
small part of the total number of accident claims. '° °
While the German scheme served as the spark for worldwide
acceptance of the principles of workers' compensation, it was the

British Act of 1897 that served as the model for American jurisdictions. °1 This Act made employers in certain industries responsible
for compensating employees for injuries "arising out of and in the
course of their employment. " " Unlike the German plan, it did not
mandate insurance coverage, although employers were free to purchase insurance.
The Act of 1906 expanded coverage to nearly all
103
workers.
In a way similar to the German and British reforms before
it, the new U.S. program (or programs) of workers' compensation
promised remedies more reliable than the common law tort arrangements."°4 Modelled after the British plan, it sought to shift work

95. Sherman, Workmen's Compensation, supra note 92, at 857.
96. Id at 858.
97. Sherman, German Workmen's Insurance Law, supra note 92, at 69.
98. Id
99. See Digby, supra note 91, at 488; Sherman, Workmen's Compensation, supra note
92, at 859.
100. Sherman, German Workaen's Insurance Law, supra note 92, at 69.
101. See 1 LARsON, supra note 90, § 5.20; Rhodes, supra note 91, at 40.
102. See, e.g., Sherman, German Workrmen's Insurance Law, supra note 92, at 68.
103. Id
104. See Arthur B. Honnold, Theory of Workaen's Compensation, 3 CORNELL L.Q. 264,
264-67 (1918). According to calculations made at the time workers' compensation laws were
adopted in the U.S., fifty-two to fifty-three percent of all workers would be ineligible for any
compensation under common law arrangements. This was due to the fact that a majority of
cases were caused by workers' negligence or by "natural hazards." See James H. Boyd, The

Economic and Legal Basis of Compulsory Industrial Insurance for Workmen, 10 MICH. L.
REV. 345, 346-51 (1912).
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place accident costs to employers. " Businesses were expected to
adjust prices in order to pass on the expense to consumers. t" The
private provision of insurance played an important role in the U.S.
system, and continues to do so today. 107 The U.S. system preserved
a role for government supervision, most obviously in the resolution of
disputes between employers and workers. However, in the vast majority of cases, claims are reviewed and benefits are distributed without
state intervention. The current British plan no longer allows private or
self insurance, and for this reason features a more prominent day-today administrative role for public authorities."°
The importance of the internalization principle as a theory that
guided the employer liability reform movements is evident in the
design of the U.S. workers' compensation system. However, there are
other pieces of evidence that attest to the importance of the principle.
One is the literature of the reform period containing disparaging references to the common law regime of employer liability."° Di approval of the common law regime does not logically compel support
for a no-fault workers' compensation statute. One could, for example,
argue that an employee should not be in a worse position than a
customer of the firm or a stranger."1 ' But the basic objection to the
common law regime was no different from the objection later made
against the principle of contributory negligence: the victim often goes
without compensation. t This objection does force one to embrace
full internalization. If the negligence of the victim, or of others,
should not be allowed to prevent a victim from receiving compensation from an injurer, whose behavior is causally connected to the
injury, then a regime of strict liability is very difficult to avoid.
The second piece of evidence pointing to the importance of the
internalization principle to the reformers is the development of a

105. See Boyd, supra note 104, at 346.
106. Eugene Wambaugh, Workmen's Compensation Acts: Their Theory and Their Constitutionality, 25 HARV. L. REV. 129, 131 (1911).
107. See 1 LARsoN, supra note 90, § 3.10.
108. Id.
109. See Francis H. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts
(Part 1), 25 HARV. L. REV. 328, 331 (1912); Boyd, supra note 104, at 346-69; Honnold,
supra note 104, at 264; J.G. Pease, An English Workman's Remedies for Injuries Received in
the Course of His Employment, at Common Law and by Statute, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 509,
513 (1915); Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REv.
235, 243 n.20, 256 (1914).
110. Smith, supra note 109, at 242.
111. See Boyd, supra note 104, at 345, 349; Smith, supra note 109, at 243.
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112
theory of enterprise liability that justified the reform movement.
Enterprise liability theory (or theories) holds that businesses should be
liable for injuries to workers in the course of production and to consumers of manufactured goods." 3 According to the theory, the injuries are a part of the cost of production and should be treated as
such. The costs of injury will be spread, as are all costs of production, to consumers in the form of higher prices and to shareholders in
the form of lower returns. One proposition that is common to any
statement of a theory of enterprise liability is that the fault standard,
or any standard of conduct, should not be used to deny compensation
to accident victims. Enterprise liability emphasizes the insurance function of a liability system, and this function is always in tension with
a system of fault standards that have the effect of limiting liability
under certain conditions.
Further evidence on the importance of the internalization principle appears in the drafting of the earliest workers' compensation
statutes in the United States. In order to avoid equal protection attacks, the early statutes claimed to limit the scope of the no-fault
regime to industries that were unusually hazardous." 4 The reason
for the limitation is that with respect to unusually hazardous activities,
the principle of full internalization had been accepted by courts. It
was embodied in the strict liability doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,"5 and received further support from several nuisance cases.""
The public acceptance of the internalization principle urged by
proponents of workers' compensation statutes was, at the same time,.
an emphatic rejection of the doctrine stated by Justice Shaw in the
most important opinion on the common law of employer liability,
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester PR.R 7 Although the opinion is
known for its statement of the "fellow-servant rule," that an employer
is not liable for the injuries to an employee caused by the negligence
of another employee, it is largely concerned with the more general

112. For a clear statement of the theory, see Wambaugh, supra note 106, at 129-31.
113. For an important critique of the theory of enterprise liability, see Priest, supra note
68.
114. See Smith, supra note 109, at 248-49 n.41.
115. 3 L.RL-E. & I. App. 330, 338-39 (H.L. 1868). For a discussion of strict liability and
unusually hazardous activities, see William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise,
92 CoLrM. L. REV. 1705 (1992); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of
Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1987).
116. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 32, §§ 22-25, at 137-49.
117. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
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problem of defining the scope of the implicit contract between the
employer and employee. Justice Shaw argued against requiring employers to compensate injured workers in all cases because employees
would ordinarily be compensated ex ante for unusual risks accepted
as part of a job."' In Shaw's view, the employment contract is in
some respects like an insurance contract, and either party may play
the role of the insurer." 9 If the employee accepts higher wages in
order to bear the risk of injury then he effectively insures the employer against injury claims that do not arise from the employer's
negligence.120 If the employee demands to be compensated for all
workplace injuries, then the employer will be forced to reduce wages
by an amount that reflects the expected cost of compensating the
employee. Shaw apparently believed, or felt, that courts should assume in the absence of obviously contradictory evidence, that the
process of private contract making carried out this insurance function
fairly well.
Implicit in Shaw's view of the employment contract is the assumption that employees are as informed as, or, in some cases, better
informed than the employer of possible workplace hazards. Under this
assumption, the bilateral insurance arrangement would be fair in the
sense that the prices of the implicit insurance policies would fully
reflect the underlying risks. 21 But if employees are not informed,
118. Id. at 56-57 ([The maxim respondeat superior] does not apply to the case of a
servant bringing his action against his own employer to recover damages for an injury arising

in the course of that employment, where all such risks and perils as the employer and the
servant respectively intend to assume and bear may be regulated by the express or implied
contract between them, and which, in contemplation of law, must be presumed to be thus
regulated." Id. at 56).

119. Specifically, if the employer is "risk neutral" (willing to spend as much as $1.00
for a 50-50 chance of winning either $0 or $2.00) and the employee is "risk averse" (unwilling to spend as much as $1.00 for a 50-50 chance of winning either $0 or $2.00), then
under a contract in which risk is spread optimally, the employer will bear all of the risk of
financial loss resulting from an injury. On the economics of risk-sharing contracts, see A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEOAL STUD.

427 (1983).
120. In this case the employee bears the residual risk of an accident, where by residual
risk, we mean the risk of an accident occurring when the employer is exercising reasonable
precaution. For example, the loss to the employee from an injury is $100, and the probability
of an injury occurring is 11100 over a period of one month when the employer complies

with the due-care standard, then under an actuarially fair insurance contract the employee
would bear the risk of injury in return for receiving $1 more in pay per month than he
would otherwise receive. For a discussion of liability insurance and pricing, see Steven
Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL L ECON. 120 (1982).
121. The prices would fully reflect underlying risks because employees would not bear
the risk of injury if they did not. The employee would either require the employer to corn-
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and the employer is better informed, then the implicit insurance contract will not work as well as Justice Shaw assumed. The uninformed
workers will most likely accept too little in exchange for bearing
unusual risks on the job.1" As a result, the employer will, in effect,
shift injury costs to workers, and have less incentive to invest in
safety. In this case, a strict liability rule, such as that provided by the
workers' compensation statutes, may correct a market failure that
would otherwise have resulted in too many workplace injuries, and
too many worker injuries going uncompensated.
Adoption of the workers' compensation statutes reflected at bottom an acceptance of a certain view of the relative informational
advantages enjoyed by employees and employers. Specifically, it
reflected a view that workers are generally not as well informed as
are employers of potential workplace hazards. In the remaining sections of this Article, we will not question this assumption; we will
take it as valid. The question we examine below is whether the goal
of internalization that is justified in part by the assumption that employees are informationally disadvantaged with respect to workplace
risks is satisfied by the workers' compensation system.
We are fully aware of the argument that shifting all accident
losses to the employer is an undesirable goal in the workers' compensation area because it would leave too little incentive on the part
of workers to minimize accident losses.1 2 In spite of this argument,

pensate him for what we have referred to as "residual risk" injuries or would not accept the
employment contract.
122. They will clearly accept too little if they underestimate the risks. Further, they are
likely to underestimate the risks for two reasons. One is strategic. If the workers are required
to purchase insurance from an employer who is presumably better informed, they are likely
to undervalue the risk of loss. The reason is that they would in effect be asked to purchase
an item (safety) that has a value that is unknown to them. The rational response is to start
with a low bid. See generally RASMUSEN, supra note 88, at 251-53. The other reason for
underestimating the risk is that knowledge of workplace hazards is an experience good. It
takes time for workers to learn about the hazards, and they must learn about them on the
job. In the learning period they are unlikely to bargain for the right compensation for accepting risks. See JOHN R. HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 110-11 (1932); H. Lome Carmichael,
Reputations for Safety: Market Performance and Policy Remedies, 4 J.LAB. ECON. 458, 459
(1986). Though in general the empirical results are inconclusive, some empirical studies
suggest that workers do underestimate job hazards. For example, Viscusi and Moore, ignoring
the problem of worker incentives for safety, found that after taking compensating wage
differentials into account, the level of benefits failed to compensate workers for their losses.
See W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Workers' Compensation: Wage Effects, Benefit
Inadequacies, and the Value of Health Losses, 69 REv. ECON. & STAT. 249 (1987).
123. This is a general problem with any strict liability scheme. See Brown, supra note
46, at 338-43. For a discussion of this problem in the workers' compensation context, see
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we think an examination of the extent of cost shifting and of externalization under workers' compensation is interesting for several reasons. Shifting accident costs to employers seems to have been an
important goal of the legislation. The workers' compensation system
has gone further than, perhaps, any other legal regime in trying to
shift accident losses from one party to another. An examination of the
extent of accident cost externalization in this area should reveal the
practical limits on our ability to shift such losses. Further, if employees are relatively uninformed about workplace hazards, then shifting
costs to the relatively informed party, the employer, should minimize
the total costs of accidents by giving employers an incentive to take
care and to inform employees about worksite hazards. 4
B. An Evaluation of Obstacles to Internalization
1. The Role of Private Insurance
Six states-Ohio, Nevada, North Dakota, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming-do not permit private carriers to offer
workers' compensation insurance; these six states, instead, operate
state managed insurance funds. I Each of the remaining forty-four

Richard 3. Butler & John D. Worrall, Work Injury Compensation and the Duration of
Nonwork Spells, 95 ECON. J. 714 (1985); Richard J. Butler & John D. Worrall, Workers'
Compensation Benefit and Injury Claims Rates in the Seventies, 65 REv. ECON. & STAT. 580
(1983); James R. Chelius, The Influence of Workers' Compensation on Safety Incentives, 35
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 235 (1982); James R. Chelius & Karen Kavanaugh, Workers'
Compensation and the Level of Occupational Injuries, 35 J. RISK & INs. 315 (1982); Bruce
D. Meyer et al., Workers' Compensation and Injury Duration: Evidence from a Natural
Experiment (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Hofstra Law Review); John D.
Worrall & David Appel, The Wage Replacement Rate and Benefit Utilization In Workers'
Compensation Insurance, 49 J. RISK & INS. 361 (1982). These papers generally demonstrate
that increases in benefit levels are followed by increases in the frequency and duration of
injury claims. The most thorough recent study of the incentive effects of workers' compensation is provided in MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KE? Viscusi, COmENSAION MECHANISMS FOR
JOB RISKS: WAGES, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT LABIuTY (1990).
124. The notion that informational asymmetry might justify strict employer liability was
first examined rigorously in Oliver B. Williamson et al., Externalities, Insurance, and Disability Analysis, 34 ECONOMIcA 235 (1967). The theory has been developed further in Peter
Diamond, Insurance Theoretic Aspects of Workers' Compensation, in NATURAL RESOURCES,
UNCERTAINrY, AND GENERAL EQUIXRIUM SYSTEMS 67 (Alan S. Blinder & Philip Friedman
eds., 1977) and Samuel Rea, Jr., Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Safety Under
Imperfect Information, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 80 (1981).
125. It should be noted that other states (eighteen, to be precise) also offer businesses
the option of buying workers' compensation insurance from a state managed fund. However,
these states allow their funds to stand alongside private funds and permit private insurers to
compete for employers' business. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands also operate
exclusive government managed funds. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STATE WORKERS' COMPEN-
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states (as well as the District of Columbia and Guam) establish specific statutory guidelines to police the insurance industry, and to regulate the pricing of workers' compensation insurance. For the present
we will set aside the idiosyncrasies of each state's approach to oversight. Regulatory intervention generally seeks two goals: to assure that
prices charged by insurance companies remain at "reasonable" levels
and to help insure solvency among insurance funds.126 Additionally,
states act to provide for continued payments in the event that failure
occurs.127 Regulatory oversight extends, as well, to cover those businesses that choose to self-insure. Self-insurance is an option available
only to the largest employers."n
The insurance industry is peculiar in that it is largely exempt
from federal antitrust legislation.' 2 9 To a great extent, the federal
government has ceded to the states the right to regulate insurance
pricing and industry practice. 130 Two approaches are presently employed to regulate pricing: prior approval and policed open competition.1 31 Only a small handful of states now allow open competition
in the area of workers' compensation." Because workers' compensation is viewed as a quasi-social insurance, states have not been as
willing to open up the system to the potential uncertainties of open
133
Incompetition as they have been with other types of insurance.
SATION LAWS tbL. 1 (1992) [hereinafter STATE COMPENSATION].

126. C. Arthur Williams, Jr., Workers' Compensation Insurance Rates, in CURRENT
ISSUES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 209, 225 (James Chelius ed., 1986).
127. States are especially likely to be concerned with workers' compensation insurance
arrangements, since the program is seen as a form of quasi-social insurance. See id at 225.
128. JEFFREY V. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION 6 (2d ed, 1989).
129.

DOUGLAS CADDY, LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN INSURANCE REGULATION 3 (1986). This

means that insurers are free to exchange information about risk and to establish uniform rates
through bureaus. Insurers are only brought under scrutiny when they engage in coercive or
intimidating practices, when they fail to be properly regulated by state authorities, or when
two large national firs seek merger. See id at 43.
130. In response to the Supreme Court's holding that the business of insurance was a
part of interstate commerce subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act, United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), Congress reasserted the preeminence of state
regulation of insurance by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 59 Stat.
33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988)). The McCarran-Ferguson
Act exempted the business of insurance from antitrust scrutiny under certain circumstances,
and declared that "the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business
of insurance is in the public interesL" 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988).
131. Williams, supra note 126, at 216-17. Texas is unique in that rates are determined
by a state board. Id. Still, this could be considered an extreme variant of the prior approval
arrangement.
132. The open competition states include Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan,
Minnesota, Oregon, and Rhode Island. See id at 217.
133. See id. at 225. Twenty-one states allow open competition in property and liability
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deed, it is improper to describe any state as practicing "open" competition in workers' compensation, since regulatory oversight is still in
place in each state. To begin with, all states have some control over
which carriers are allowed to operate in the state." Oregon and
Arkansas require insurers to file all rate plans with state commissioners. 135 Georgia and Minnesota have excess profit statutes which prohibit insurers from reaping profits beyond an established threshold.
Florida specifically outlaws excessive profits in workers' compensation insurance." 3 With the exception of Minnesota, all of the states
practicing open competition in workers' compensation allow rate
bureaus to establish "advisory rates." 37 These target rates serve to
shape pricing, although companies are in no way required to match

them. 131 Michigan, Minnesota, and Oregon each operate state insurance funds which compete with private carriers for business.'39 This
option provides employers with a low-cost alternative. While it is
generally true that state funds fail to offer services comparable to
larger private carriers (such as loss control programs, year-end rebates, and medical expert testimony), state funds encourage price
competition. An inexpensive option will probably remain attractive to
smaller firms in particular; smaller firms are often poorly situated to
take great advantage of loss control/accident prevention programs
offered by larger insurers.
An overwhelming majority of states demand that insurers seek
prior approval for all rate plans.14° In most of these states, rate
plans are prepared by rate bureaus, which present rates to the state
insurance commission for final approval.'41 Once the state's insurance commission approves a rate schedule, companies can petition for
permission to deviate from the rate plan.142 This arrangement-the
insurance, while only eight have opened up competition in the workers' compensation field.
See id. at 223.
134. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION: ADNHNISTRATION PROFILES
(1990) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION PROFILES]. As a minimum, companies must comply with

fair practice standards which guide all business activities in the state. In most states, cariers
must meet additional minimum requirements.
135. Williams, supra note 126, at 222.
136. Id. at 232.
137. Id. at 218-19.
138. Id) at 217.
139. See ADMINISTRATION PROFILES, supra note 134, at 186, 194, 317.
140. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 126, at 218-19.
141. Williams, supra note 126, at 216-17.
142. Id at 220. California, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin are among the states that do not allow deviations.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss1/3

36

Hylton and Laymon: The Internalization Paradox and Workers' Compensation
1992]

INTERNALIZATION PARADOX

allowance of modest deviation from approved rates-introduces opportunities for limited competition into the system. Insurers, perhaps with
justification, complain that prior approval arrangements interfere with
the efficient management of business. 43 Because rates must be approved in advance, and remain relatively fixed, insurers are not situated to respond with immediacy to shifting loss experience.'" It
should also be pointed out that prior approval arrangements involve
higher levels of state intervention, and, as a result, carry greater administrative costs.
There are three basic approaches to setting prices in workers'
compensation insurance: retrospective rating, class rating, and experience rating.14 ' Actually, it should be recognized that class rating
and experience rating are often employed side-by-side within the
insurer's rate fixing calculation."4 Experience rating is, in fact, a
"way of modifying these class rates to take into account the specific
firm's injury history or experience." 47 This interaction will be described in a moment, but first we will introduce the basic elements of
retrospective rating. Retrospectively rated companies pay a premium
that is determined by their loss performance over the previous year.
That is, at the conclusion of the policy period, the company pays the
insurer an amount equal to its total losses plus, of course, an additional sum sufficient to provide the insurer with payment for service. 48 Retrospective rating is unique among the three systems to
be discussed because it alone assesses premiums not on the basis of
expected losses over the policy period ahead, but according to the
actual losses incurred in the period just passed. The insurer renders
compensation to injured workers, carries the administrative expenses
attached to the dispensation of benefits, and, at the conclusion of the
policy period, prepares a bill for the full cost of these services-inserting, of course, a profit margin. Retrospective rating, in a
sense, provides a sort of "quasi-self-insurance." 49 There is one important qualification: the insurer often requires employers to pay a

143. Id. at 224-25.
144. CADDY, supra note 129, at 49-50.
145. Williams, supra note 126, at 210-14.
146. Id. at 213.
147. Richard B. Victor, Experience Rating and Workplace Safety, in WORKERS' CoMPENSATION BENEFITS: ADEQUACY, EQUrrY, AND EFPCIENCY 71, 72 (John D. Worrall &
David Appel eds., 1985) [hereinafter Victor, Experience Rating].
148. Williams, supra note 126, at 213.
149. Id. at 214.
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minimum fee, although in exchange, the employer is given the promise thathowever costly losses may be, the employer's fee will not
exceed a maximum."5 Accordingly, in a year with very low losses-that is, with only a few accidents resulting in fairly small
claims-the employer pays a premium that, perhaps, actually exceeds
losses. Yet in a less fortunate year-filled with many accidents and
costly claims-the employer may actually reduce the cost of his losses. This is a benefit not available to the self-insured.
The two more frequently used approaches to price setting are
class rating and experience rating."' Under a class rated system, all
employers whose businesses fall within a particular class of industry
pay an identical rate.'52 In prior approval states, these rates must be
approved before the insurer can use them to calculate premiums.'53
An individual employer's premium is determined by the size of his
payroll: generally, employers pay a specific industry-fixed rate per
$100 of payroll.' 54 For example, an employer with a $1,000,000
payroll might pay $1,200 per year for insurance (an unlikely $0.12
per $100 of payroll), while another employer, in the same industry,
with a payroll of $10,000,000, would pay $12,000 a year in premiums. Different rates are developed for each industry according to the
incidence (and cost) of work related injury. 55 In practice, insurance
companies take into account the various types of labor undertaken
under the same roof. For example, a construction company will often
employ a clerical staff as a well as crane operators." Clerical
work, of course, is usually much less risky than operating a crane at
a construction site. Accordingly, insurers will calculate premiums not
only according to industry type, but also according to job description.
Imagine that a construction company has a total payroll of $200,000
for construction site workers and $50,000 for clerical office employees.'" Assume that the class rate for construction work is $2.50 per
$100 of payroll, and the class rate for clerical work is $0.25 per $100
of payroll. The company's premium would be 2,OOO($2.50) +
500($0.25), or $5,125.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

l at 213.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 21-11.
See id. at 211.
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2. Experience Rating
This would be a suitable arrangement if all competing businesses
within a particular industry were equal in their acceptance of risk and
commitment to safety (and equally lucky). If this were true, class
rating would provide a useful mechanism for establishing prices that
accurately reflect each company's loss-experience. Obviously, some
employers enjoy better safety records than others operating within the
same industry. Insurance companies need to put into place some
procedure for identifying these differences and adjusting prices. Under
experience rating, an employer's class premium is modified to reflect
the firm's specific injury experience. As a standard, the employer's
loss experience over the preceding three year period is reviewed and
compared to the "average" loss profile expected for a company engaged in that particular type of industry. For example, if an
employer's accident losses were only half of the industry's expected
average, his premium would be trimmed back to half that paid by the
"average" employer in that industry.
However, insurers recognize that through the intervention of a
variety of factors (including chance), accident losses from year to
year may vary widely. That is, the loss experience observed over any
particular three year period may not accurately reflect an employer's
proper ioss expectation. Accordingly, insurers introduce into the calculation a "credibility factor.""' The smaller the firm, the more important the use of this credibility factor. The loss experience of larger
firms reveal a statistical regularity from year to year.159 Smaller
firms, especially those engaged in less dangerous industries, are especially susceptible to the play of chance. For example, a bakery which
employs ten people may not experience any significant losses due to
workplace accidents over a five or seven year period."0 However,
without explanation, three or four workers may be seriously injured
over the course of a two year period (say two are badly burned in a
gas-oven explosion and two others are injured the following year in
separate kitchen accidents). Following this atypical sequence of inju-

158. Id. at 212.
159. Id. at 212-13; see also RICHARD B. VICTOR, WoRKERS' COMPENSATON AND
WORKPLACE SAFETY: THE NATURE OF EMPLOYER FINANCIAL INCENTIVES ix (1982); Victor,
Experience Rating, supra note 147, at 74.
160. This is a simplified example presented merely to provide illustration. It is perhaps
likely that in reality this firm would pay a class premium of less than $2,500 a year and, as
we explain below, would therefore not be eligible for experience rating.
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ries, a straight experience based calculation focusing on a review of
the past three years would result in a large jump in the bakery's
insurance fee. The introduction of a credibility factor would yield a
more appropriate calculation of expected loss for the year ahead. It is
important to remember that experience rating schemes emphasize a
forward-looking calculation, that is, insurers wish to predict losses and
costs in the year ahead, not to penalize for losses in the years passed.
Imagine that a moderate-sized employer has a credibility rating of
twenty percent, and over the course of the period under review the
company experiences only half the losses expected for an "average"
company of its size engaged in that particular industry.16 Instead of
reducing the company's premiums for the year ahead by one half, the
insurer would reduce the fee by an amount equal to (50%) x (20%),
or ten percent. That is, the experience component (50% of expected
losses) would be multiplied by the credibility factor (20%) to yield
the percentage of adjustment in the employer's fees (in this case, a
downward adjustment). As one observer explains, "[iln practice, insurers assign no credibility to the experience of employers with average
class premiums of less than $2,500. "162 Above that, threshold credibility increases gradually from one to one hundred percent.63 Of
course, as this suggests, the premiums of very large firms are almost
wholly determined by their experience rating, without the meaningful
intervention of a credibility component."6 The effect is not unlike
that arrived at through retrospective rate calculations: the employer
pays the "full" expense of shop floor accident costs. The difference,
of course, is that the retrospective rate fixing arrangement sets prices
with reference to past experience, while experience rating shapes
prices according to expected losses in the year ahead. This means that
only large firms carry the "full" burden of their losses arising from
work-related accidents. Small businesses may pay less (or, in some
cases, more) than the full cost of their annual losses because class
rates fail to accurately reflect the specific dimensions of their year to
year loss experiences. 6

161. See Williams, supra note 126, at 212.
162. Id.

163. Id.
164. Victor, Experience Rating, supra note 147, at 72-74.
165. Empirical studies demonstrate that the incentive effects of experience rating are
negligible for small firms. See John W. Ruser, Workers' Compensation Insurance,
Experience-Rating, and Occupational Injuries, 16 RAND J. ECON. 487, 493 (1985); Louise B.
Russell, Safety Incentives in Workmen's Compensation Insurance, 4 J. HuM. RESoURCES 361,
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The vast majority of shop floor injury claims are processed, and
benefits are paid, without the intervention of the state accident
board. " It is difficult (and may be impossible) to specify exactly
what percentage of claims are paid without challenge. There are differences from company to company and between states, and different
types of claims are challenged at different rates. It seems the more
costly the claim or the more ambiguous the disability, the more likely
it is that an employer will file a challenge."6 One can, however,
offer a fairly reliable thumbnail estimate. Nationally, about eleven
percent of all work place accident claims are challenged.'
This
means that eighty-nine percent of all work place accident claims are
processed-and, in day-to-day reality, probably somewhat more-and
reimbursement is provided, without the involvement of state arbitrators or hearing officers.' 69 In short, administrative costs are carried
by the insurer and passed on to the employer in the form of the
service fee charged to every customer as a part of his or her premium. Private insurance arrangements influence the internalization of
loss by shaping premiums (primarily for large businesses) through the
use of retrospective-rating and experience-rating to more accurately
capture an employer's true loss experience, 7 ' and by shifting most

363 (1974).
166. See ADMINISTRATION PROFILE, supra note 134, at 481-88 (providing nationwide
figures of contested case information).
167. For a discussion of this conclusion, see LESLIE 1. BODEN, REDUCING LITIGATION:
EVIDENCE FROM WISCONSIN 34-36 (1988). Boden offers other possibilities, but extends recognition to the plausibility of this conclusion. See also LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND & THOMAS J. KNIESNER, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 32-36 (1980);
David E. Bloom, Is Arbitration Really Compatible with Bargaining?, 20 INDuS. REL. 233,
233-36 (1981); Karen Roberts, Predicting Disputes in Workers' Compensation, 59 J. RISK &
INS. 252, 255 (1992).
168. See ADMINISTRATION PROFILES, supra note 134, at 481-88. Annually, among states
providing data, about 2.4 million claims were filed, while nearly 266,000 hearings were
requested. Another report offers a figure of nearly twelve percent. This figure represents an
estimate drawn from a sample of states. See JOHN H. LEwiS, ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 82 (1989) (providing National Council on
Compensation Insurance data).
169. Many shop floor accident victims are promptly treated by company physicians and
sent home with pay for a few days to recover. Such incidents, however, do not appear on
state industrial accident board reports if, as is likely, no formal claim is filed.
170. For a discussion of this relationship, see THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 93-98 (July 1972) [hereinafter NATIONAL
COMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission's findings call into question certain common expectations attached to experience-rating. The Commission found unconvincing evidence that
experience-rating shapes company safety performance. However, the Commission did place
enough confidence in experience-rating that it recommended that experience-rating be more
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administrative costs to employers through the service fee charged by
insurers.
3. Obstacles to Internalization in the Insurance System
In evaluating obstacles in the insurance system to the internalization goal of workers' compensation, two general areas of the insurance market should be examined. One is the regulation of competition
and pricing in the insurance industry. The other is the pricing itself;
whether, for reasons unrelated to regulation, it accurately reflects risk.
a. Regulation of Competition and Pricing
Regulation of competition and pricing in the insurance industry
can be subdivided into two categories: structural regulation, or laws
requiring "structural compliance"; and operational regulation, or laws
requiring "operational compliance." Structural regulations must be
satisfied by any insurer before it can operate lawfully. In this category fall most types of minimum capital requirement. Exclusive state
provision of insurance is another type of structural compliance requirement, since it eliminates private provision of workers' compensation insurance. Excess profits statutes, like those in place in Minnesota and Georgia, may also be considered structural compliance regulations, though this is admittedly on the borderline between operational
and structural regulation. Laws requiring operational compliance are
those that apply to the day-to-day operations of an insurer. Prior
approval, is one type of operational compliance requirement. The
provision of a state run insurance program, as an alternative to private insurance, is also a form of operational compliance, since the
state fund will set price standards that put pressure on private insurers.
Structural and operational compliance requirements affect externalization of accident costs largely through limiting the ability of
insurers to match prices with costs. In a world of perfect insurance
pricing, the price per dollar of coverage of a policy would be equal
at all times to the probability of an accident (which is the expected
cost per dollar of coverage)."' Competition in the insurance market
tends to drive the price per dollar of coverage toward the probability
of an accident, and in this sense, drives prices toward costs. If prices

widely used. See also Victor, Experience Rating, supra note 147, at 83-85.
171. See, e.g., SHAVEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 15, at 203.
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are not equal to costs, then externalization results because insured
parties do not bear the full costs of their accident-causing behavior.
Consider the externalization effects of the following types of
structural regulation: banning private insurers, minimum capital requirements, and excess profits statutes. The outright banning of private insurers could lead to the worst form of externalization because
a state run monopoly insurer would not have competitors to push its
prices in line with its costs. There are two reasons for this: the obvious one is that competition forces firms to lower their prices; the less
obvious reason is that it is hard to identify the administrative costs of
running an insurance firm in the absence of competition."7 Further,
without the profit motive, there is little incentive for a public insurer
to align prices with costs. It may seem intuitive that the profit motive
would lead a monopoly insurer to charge the highest price possible."7 But there are reasons to think that a monopolist in the insurance market would not simply charge the highest price possible. First,
the best pricing strategy for such a firm would be a two-part price
consisting of a flat charge to all customers and a price per dollar of
coverage set at roughly the competitive rate. 74 Second, any
profit-oriented insurer would be concerned about the incentive effects
of a flat monopoly price charged to all customers. In order to give
customers the proper incentives to avoid losses, the price would have
to vary with the level of risk created by the insured, and this, other
things equal, will put a constraint on the firm's power to charge the
highest price possible.
Minimum capital requirements present a barrier to entry and
therefore restrict competition, which eliminates some of the pressure
that drives price toward cost in each line of insurance. Of course,
they also eliminate undercapitalized, fly-by-night insurers, so it is
impossible to say that the net effect on the welfare of insurance consumers is negative. We can only say unambiguously that capital requirements are not a necessary part of a consumer protection plan.
Consumers can be equally well protected by certification procedures

172. In the absence of competition, monopoly rents tend to be transferred into "costs" as
unions and other constituencies bargain against shareholders for shares of the rent. See
DONALD DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAw 249-51 (1959).
173. More precisely, the monopoly will charge the "monopoly price." For an introductory
discussion of the theory of monopoly, see GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE
210-14 (1952).
174. Walter Y. Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse
Monopoly, 85 QJ. ECON. 77 (1971).
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or any information gathering agency that allows consumers to obtain
reliable information on the reputations of insurers.1"
The excess profits statutes affect externalization through a more
subtle route. If the rate of return is defined as the return on capital,
such statutes create an incentive for insurers to use capital intensive

methods

of operation. 176 To the extent

that these

are not

cost-minimizing, the overall operating costs of regulated firms will be
greater. These costs will be passed on to the consumer to some extent
in the form of higher prices. Thus, regulation of this form may widen
that portion of the wedge between price and cost that is attributable
to administrative costs.
Operational compliance requirements have similar effects on the
pricing of insurance. Prior approval limits the ability of each insurer
to change rates immediately to reflect new information, positive or
negative, on potential claims. The result is a set of rates that are
smoother over time and that less closely track underlying costs than
would be observed in a truly free or open competition regime. To see
why, consider the following simple example. Suppose unit cost is $1
in period 1 and $10 in period 2; and suppose that the insurer will be
able to win approval for a higher price only after one half of the
second period has passed. Suppose further that the interest rate is
zero. Then, assuming a uniform rate of service, to break even, the
insurer's first period price would have to be: $1(2/3) + $10(1/3)

$4.
The existence of a state run program has an effect on prices
which may result in further externalization of accident costs. In the
presence of a guaranty fund designed to cover the claims of bankrupt
insurers, a state run insurance provider may give some insurers an

175. Note that the same argument may be made about licensing. The purpose is always
to protect consumers who cannot determine product quality easily. Further, consumers have
too little incentive to gather information on product quality because such information is a
public good. Once one consumer incurs the cost of gathering information, the information can
be made available to all consumers almost costlessly; and given this incentive structure, no
rational consumer would go out and collect information. But consumers can be equally
protected by a certification process and the public good problem can be solved by having the
state provide information. None of this requires the state to limit entry. The economic case
against licensing was first put forward by John Stuart Mill in the final chapter of On Liberty.
See MILL, supra note 40; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPIrAIusM AND FREEDOM 137-60
(1962) (elaborating on the argument against licensing).

176. This is the familiar "Averch-Johnson" effect of the industrial organization literature.
For the original discussion of the effect, see Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior
of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
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"excessive" incentive to underprice in order to compete with the state
run insurer. This will tend to push price below cost and result in a
larger number of claims than would be observed in the absence of
such pressures. The reason the incentive to underprice may be excessive is that the guaranty fund eliminates much of the downside risk
for the insurer. At the same time, the state insurance provider may
force the private insurer to cut prices drastically in order to hold on
to its customers. The end result is something analogous to the problem caused by federal deposit insurance in the banking industry: "
private firms have too great an incentive to engage in risky activities
(risky insurance contracts in this case, risky lending in the banking
case). The state run insurer, by competing at subsidized rates which
are difficult for private firms to match, provides a further push in the
direction of excessively risky activity.
The likely effect of all of this regulation on accident cost externalization is unclear. Licensing and minimum capital requirements
limit entry and therefore lead to supracompetitive prices, which implies that accident costs will be overinternalized. By making prices
rigid, prior approval should lead to overinternalization followed by
underinternalization when costs are expected to rise, and conversely
when costs are expected to fall. Of course, if because of political
pressure, insurance commissions force firms to set price below cost,
externalization will result. 7 Guaranty funds and state provided insurance both tend to encourage firms to set prices below cost, which
results in underinternalization.
b. Externalization and Experience Rating
If there is a common argument concerning experience rating, it is
that there is too little of it.179 The typical complaint is that the insurance industry, for some reason, does not use experience rating as
much as it should. As a result, prices do not reflect costs as closely
as they would in a regime of liberal experience rating. If experience
rating were perfect and costless, this position would be unassailable.

177. See EDWARD J. KANE, THE S & L INSURANCE MEss: How DID rr HAPPEN? 2-9
(1989) (describing adverse incentive effects of federal deposit insurance leading to excessively

risky behavior).
178. On the politicization of state regulation of workers' compensation prices, see Richard
J. Butler & David Appel, Benefit Increases in Workers' Compensation, 56 S.EcoN. J. 594
(1990).
179. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 170, at 98.
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It would be difficult to understand why insurance companies use
experience rating as little as they do.
But experience rating is not costless. There are two types of cost
that are fairly important One is the administrative cost of running
such a system-which is significant. The other involves the set of
costs that are generated by the adverse incentives introduced by an
experience rating system. The adverse incentive problem is one that
has received far too little attention in the literature to date. The problem is that once an experience rating system is put into place, the
insured has every incentive to minimize reported claims in order to
keep rates from increasing. For example, a company would have an
incentive under experience rating to set up an internal administrative
board to review claims before they reach the insurer and suppress or
in some other way pay off those that could be settled cheaply.
Terence Ison argues that it is claims control, not accident prevention,
that is promoted by shifting accident cost responsibility to employers."' Prevention is costly. Investments must be made in new
equipment, training programs, and supervision. If the number of injury claims can be reduced without the investment associated with the
adoption of these measures, then the firm can enjoy the benefits
offered by reduced premiums without burdening itself with any significant new costs. Accordingly, firms may try to discourage injured
workers from reporting injuries, they may pressure supervisors to
resist or denounce workers' claims, or they may formally challenge
more claims, hoping to reduce the amount of the award."'
One would imagine that in most work sites, the largest number
of claims would fall into this "claims control" category. The problem
with this is that the insurer would then, in effect, be denied information on the true claims experience of the company, and its rates
would therefore be inadequate. In situations where the costs of monitoring are extremely high, it is possible that the insurer would prefer
some alternative pricing arrangement which did not have the perverse
incentive effect of experience rating.
Our view is that in fight of the underlying economics, there is
too little evidence to support the conclusion that, in the absence of
government regulation, the inability of insurers to set prices that accurately reflect underlying risks is a cause of large scale externalization

180. Terence Ison, The Significance of Experience Rating, 24 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 723,
725-26, 729 (1986).
181. Id. at 725-26.
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in the insurance market. Note that this was one of the major claims
of Calabresi in his critique of the tort system.1/ The contract between the insured and the insurer provides incentives for both to aim
to increase precaution whenever it is less costly than paying the
claims for accidents. Pricing is one method of providing an incentive
for the insured to adopt all cost-justified precautions, but it is not the
only method. The insurer can ask or demand that the insured invest
more in safety enhancement. The insurer will use one of its instruments, price or direct bargaining backed up by threats to deny or to
not renew coverage, to encourage the insured to increase precaution.
The view that imperfect insurance pricing inevitably leads to a
dilution of incentives to take care is based on an inaccurate, though
widespread, view of the function of insurance firms. The traditional
notion is that the insurance firm simply pools risks. But the insurance
firm is often a source of information for the insured." 3 To consider
the simplest example, suppose the insurance firm is better at calculating the risk of an accident occurring than is the insured. Then enhanced precaution might be the result of simply passing on information on the relationship between precaution and accidents to the insured. There are many other examples in which the insurer stands
between two contracting parties, such as manufacturer and a shipper.
Obviously, the manufacturer and shipper could in many cases arrange
their own insurance between themselves. Yet we still see these parties
purchasing insurance. The likely reason is that the insurance provides
information that the parties are unwilling to trust each other to provide. It is quite inaccurate in this setting to conclude that insurance
tends to dilute incentives to take care. The information provision role
may dominate the other functions in a way that leads to a net enhancement in incentives for parties to make precautionary investments.
4. Legal Challenges and the Externalization of Costs
a. Costs Related to Legal Challenges
When claims are challenged, the state industrial accident board
(or a similar body) retains authority for resolving disputes and setting
benefit levels!" 4 If initial resolution efforts fail, most states allow

182. CALABREsI, supra note 2, at 239-308.
183. See G6ran Skogh, The Transactions Cost Theory of Insurance: Contracting Impediments and Costs, 56 J. RISK & INs. 726 (1989).
184. See ADMINISTRATION PROFILS, supra note 134, at 462-80 (providing a full listing
of such bodies).
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claims to be appealed to the courts."' When parties to a dispute
turn to the arbitration process (or later to the courts), they are likely
to seek legal representation. As indicated earlier, about eleven percent
of all workers' compensation claims are appealed to at least the first
stage of the resolution process."s An even larger number of cases-about twenty-five percent of the whole-feature the involvement
of attorneys."s Why do disabled workers secure the services of attorneys even in cases where challenges are not filed? The answer, it
seems, is that workers' compensation laws too often seem an impenetrable tangle to disabled workers."'
What do legal challenges translate into in terms of costs? Exact
figures are difficult, if not impossible to isolate. However, a sample
of figures from several states may provide a hint. In Illinois, for
example, among cases featuring attorney involvement, workers pay,
on average, $1,975 in legal fees per case. 8 9 Legal fees should be
understood to combine attorneys' fees and medicolegal expenses connected with medical evaluation and testimony. Employers can be
imagined to pay a similar amount, or perhaps a little more. All in all,
litigation costs for all cases in Illinois amounted to $178,000,000 in
1988, or a little more than fourteen percent of the total sum of benefits distributed to workers."9 In neighboring Wisconsin, workers pay
an average of $3,370 in legal fees per case, while employers pay a
considerably greater $8,010 in fees. 91 Altogether, litigation costs in
Wisconsin constitute about twenty-five percent of the cost of the
average claim."9 In Texas, a state often characterized as unusually
litigious," workers on average spend $3,661 per case on litigation
costs, while employers spend about $1,500 more." 4 Again, as was
the case with costs in Wisconsin, litigation expenses in Texas make

185. Id. at 481-88.
186. Id.; see also supra note 168 and accompanying text.
187. See LEWIS, supra note 168, at 82.
188. Id. at 105-06.
189. Id. at 83.
190. Id.
191. SARA R. PEASE, PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR PERMANENT DISABILrTY: Low-BACK
INJURIES IN WISCONSIN 19 (1987). Figures are for permanent disability cases.
192. Id.
193. PETER S. BARTH ET AL, WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN TEXAS: ADMINISTRATIVE
INVENTORY 65 (1989).
194. SARA R. PEASE, PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR PERMANENT DISABILT: LOw-BACK
INURIES IN TEXAS 21-22 (1988).
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up twenty-five percent of the cost of the average claim. ' Finally,
we turn to New Jersey. New Jersey is unusual in that employers are
usually required to bear half the cost of workers' legal fees. " Perhaps as a result, nearly one hundred percent of all disabled workers
contesting claims seek legal representation.1" Still, friction costs directly linked to litigation per case are lower in New Jersey than in
Texas and Wisconsin, and are about the same as costs in Illinois-workers' legal fees average $1,559 per case (with employers
paying half of that total), while employers, on average, carry separate
legal costs of $2,375.198 Legal costs make up eighteen percent of
the cost of the average claim.1"
Large or costly claims are particularly likely to be challenged. 2" There are a variety of standard appeals available to employers (and their insurers). To begin with, injuries must be clearly
linked to a worker's employment.2"' This seems straightforward
enough: either the worker was or was not injured on the shop floor.
But it is not so simple. Lawyers, responding to a recent survey prepared by the authors, point out that it is often difficult to prove that
compensation is due when accidents occur without a witness present.2 Employers will generally contend that the injury occurred
outside of the work place, and that the employee's claim is spurious.
Employers will also question whether or not a worker was serving in
a work-related capacity at the time of injury. Workers who were
engaged in some activity outside of their normal duties at the time of
injury may find their claims challenged, the assumption being that the
worker had chosen to engage in the activity without the knowledge,
authorization, or supervision of his or her employer. While compensa-

195. Id. at 21.
196. SARA R. PEASE, PERr-ORMANCE INDICATORS FOR PERMANENT DISABILITY: LoW-BACK
INJURiES IN NEW JERSEY 20 (1987) [hereinafter PEASE, NEW JERSEY].
197. See ADMINISTRATION PROFILES, supra note 134, at 255. In many cases, workers
involved in disputed claims must by law secure the services of an attorney. See also PEASE,
NEW JERSEY, supra note 196, at 18.
198. PEASE, NEW JERSEY, supra note 196, at 19-20.
199. Id. at 19.
200. On the determinants of the likelihood of a challenge, see Philip S. Borba & David
Appel, The Propensity of Permanently Disabled Workers to Hire Lawyers, 40 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 418 (1987); Roberts, supra note 167, at 253.
201. Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Workers' Compensation
Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L REV. 405, 406, 419 (1988).
202. Information drawn from responses and personal communications between authors and
Illinois attorneys. Because the number of respondents was low, this reflects not a conclusion,
but the opinion of experienced attorneys with years of practice in the Illinois system.
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tion is due even in cases where the worker plays a contributing role
in his or her injury, compensation is not due if a working relationship

is not 3 established, or if the injury occurs outside of such a relation2

ship. 0
Workers will find particular types of disabilities difficult to link
with certainty to their employment in the work place. Claims associated with occupational diseases or mental illnesses which develop slowly, or which can also be linked with causes outside of the work
place, are often successfully challenged by employers. 2 4 Such medical conditions include: lung cancer, hearing loss, blindness, heart
disease, radiation sickness, lead poisoning, asbestosis, and stress disor-

ders. Claims of this type are frequently targeted for appeal for three
reasons: (1) they are often extremely costly (since they generally
involve permanent disability), (2) they involve afflictions that can be
caused by a variety of environmental factors completely unrelated to
employment, and (3) the extended period of latency associated with
some of these afflictions can cause workers to delay filing a
claim. °5
This final point is significant because most states have filing
deadlines that require workers to put forward a claim within a specified period of time following an accidenL2' Failure to do so can
result in the dismissal of a worker's claim for compensation. 2°
Most states require that workers notify their employer of their disability within thirty days of the accident, and that an official claim be
2°
filed with the state industrial accident board within a year or two.
In cases where exposure to harmful chemical or radioactive contamination produces illness years later, workers will find that their claims
very likely will be challenged by their employers. In many states,
industrial accident board officials are willing to waive filing date
requirements and will allow workers' claims to stand. 21 Such judgments are made on a case-by-case basis, however. As a result, workers filing claims for illnesses caused by a worksite exposure several
203. King, supra note 201, at 418-19.
204. DARLING-HAMMOND & KNIESNER, supra note 167, at 33.
205. Id. at 33-35.
206. U.S. CMHMBER OF COMMERCE, 1990 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS COMPENSATION LAWS
31-34 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 ANALYSIS].

207. Id.
208. M,
209. The rules regarding filing deadlines are in place not to impo e undue restrictions on
employees, but to allow employers a reasonable oppottunity to investigate the facts surround.
ing an injury. See, &g., LEWIS, supra note 168, at 72-73.
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years earlier will proceed under uncertain conditions. In their uncertainty, they may well be disposed to make-do with less than generous
settlements offered by their employers.
Sometimes employers are willing to challenge claims even
though they hold out little hope that their challenges will ultimately
prevail. Nearly every state statutorily condemns spurious challenges
by employers (and insurers); yet, because of the inherent difficulty in
enforcing a good faith requirement, some employers will have incentives to continue to pursue appeals with little regard for the strength
of their cases. Since workers must provide for their own legal costs,
repeated appeals may encourage workers to seek an arranged settlement.
In most states the size of workers' attorneys' fees are regulated
in some fashion. Nineteen states require that attorneys representing
injured workers secure approval of all fees charged, either by the
industrial accident board or by a court. 210 Many other states determine by statute or industrial accident board policy the specific allowable fee.211 In Illinois, for example, attorneys' fees are limited to
twenty percent of the total award.21 Nevertheless, legal costs can
become an obstacle to the pursuit of compensation. In the first place,
since attorneys' fees are often capped, lawyers may decline to challenge an appeal unless there is a high probability that the challenge
will be successful. If success is not assured, the attorney has an incentive to recommend accepting an offered settlement. Second, while
attorneys' fees are capped, fees for expert medical testimony are not.
Obviously, workers require such testimony if their cases are to be
presented before (to draw on the Illinois example) the Industrial Commission or a circuit court judge.
Figures illustrating the considerable cost of attorneys' fees, of

210. STATE COMPENSATION, supra note 125, at tbl. 18. These states (or jurisdictions)
include: Alaska, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina,

Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, wisconsin, and Wyoming.
211. It should be noted that as a rule, states do not impose limits on the fees charged
by attorneys representing employers or insurers. See id. This differential treatment seems to
be two-edged. On one side, injured workers are protected from attorneys who may otherwise
charge inappropriate fees. But on the other side, there is no limit to the expense businesses
can devote to overturning a claim: employers and insurers can arrange to secure costly (and
perhaps more effective) legal representation.
212. Id. It should be stressed that this amount is not addfitonal to the award, but drawn
from it. See Illinois Workers' Compensation Act § 16, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.16
(Smith-Hurd 1986).
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course, only provide a part of the picture; they say nothing about the
expenses associated with the state's administrative and adjudicative instruments. Whenever a case is appealed, state officials-industrial
accident board arbitrators, administrative law jurists, and state court
judges-must step forward to render a judgment on the disputed
claim. One can gain a rough sense of the cost of administrative expenses if the annual expenditures of each state's industrial accident
board is divided by the number of cases handled each year. Of
course, in most cases this would not include the costs carried by the
court system, where some claims eventually are resolved. However,
the number of cases which find their way into the courts is relatively
small (although the number is a bit greater in certain states). 213 All
in all, therefore, we can safely propose that the annual expenditures
carried by a state industrial accident board offers a rough estimate of
the public costs of administration and adjudication.214
Let us first look at each of the four states examined in the preceding section. In Illinois, the system hands down about 58,500 decisions per year.215 The annual budget for the Industrial Commission
is $10,985,800.26 This means that the state spends on average
about $188 per disputed case. In Wisconsin, appeals are first heard by
administrative law judges within the Workers' Compensation Division
of the Department of Industry, Labor, and Human Relations
("WCD"). The WCD's operations are supported by an annual budget

of a little less than

$4,300,000.21'

Given that the WCD renders

6,853 decisions per year, the average cost to the state per disputed

213. See ADMINISTRATION PROFILES, supra note 134.
214. Of course, the budget in most cases also includes moneys for the administration of
special funds-second injury funds and the like-under the control of the industrial accident
board. This should not be a problem if our goal is to identify the costs of administration and
adjudication. Indeed, these are clearly administrative costs, and often the distribution of
benefits from such funds requires an adjudicative decision. Most budgets also, however,
contain moneys directed toward the acquisition of information about the frequency and cause
of work place injuries, and other services not directly associated with the processing of acci-

dent claims.
215.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1990

11 (1990).
216. See ADMINISTRATION PROFILES, supra note 134, at 116. It should be noted that the

comparability of these figures is open to review. These numbers are taken from state reports
and it is possible that states with different approaches to cas6 resolution offer different
understandings of when a decision is taken. That is to say, some states may include among
the total number of decisions, resolutions negotiated by arbitrators, while others only list final
decisions handed down by the chief appeals panel.
217. See id at 421.
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claim is about $627.218 We should make mention of Texas, since
we have previously used it as an example. Texas law was revised in
1991 and new figures giving a solid sense of how challenges are
processed are not yet available. If we look at numbers for 1989 and
1990, we find that the old system carried an annual budget of nearly
$59,0 ,000.219 The system settled around 71,500 cases, indicating
an administrative cost per case of approximately $ 8 2 5 .'20 In New
Jersey about 48,700 disputed cases are resolved annually." The
New Jersey annual budget is approximately $6,020,000, resulting in a
Nationally, Ohio's Bureau of
cost per case of about $123.'
Workers' Compensation has the largest budget of any state:
$81,400,000. 223 It resolves around 200,525 cases per year, meaning
that each case costs the state about $405.' However, it must be
recognized that this figure includes within it the various costs attached to the payment of benefits to disabled workers. Ohio, one may
remember, requires all businesses to insure with the state's exclusive
insurance fund.' New York State's Workers' Compensation Board
has the next greatest annual budget-about $77,748,800-and may
It hands down about
offer a more representative example.'
433,000 decisions per year, resulting in a seemingly efficient average
cost per claim of about $ 1 8 0 .227 The system with the smallest annual budget is Delaware's. The Delaware Industrial Accident Board
operates on a budget of $420,600. 8 It hands down 829 decisions
per year, for an average cost per claim of about $507. 9 Among all
the states, Alabama's WCD may be among the most efficient. Like
218. Id
219. Id at 369.
220. TEXAS INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 50 (1989). In this
case decisions are understood to be compromise settlement agreements ('CSAs"). Eighty-five
percent of disputed cases are resolved at some point in the appeals process through CSAs.
The administrative cost is reached by dividing the budget by the number of cases. See
BARTH, supra note 193, at 107. This is an unusual feature of the old Texas system. Whether
this standard will continue under the new system remains to be seen.
221. Correspondence with Mark E. Litowitz, Director and Chief Judge, State of New
Jersey Department of Labor, Division of Workers' Compensation (June 18, 1992) (on file
with the Hofstra Law Review).
222. Id.
223. See ADMINISTRATION PROFILES, supra note 134, at 299.
224. Id.
225. See STATE COMPENSATION, supra note 125, at tbl. 1.
226. Id. at 276.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 62.
229. Id.
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Delaware, Alabama devotes an unusually small share of resources
toward workers' compensation. With an annual budget of $631,000,
the Alabama WCD. resolves about 4,703 cases per year, resulting in
an average cost of $134 per claim.'
b. Externalization Due to Litigation
To this point, we have detailed the factors that generate litigation
in the workers' compensation program. We have said little, however,
about the connection between litigation and the externalization of
accident costs. There are three ways in which the costliness of litigation leads to externalization under the workers' compensation system.
The first is claims that are dropped, never filed, or settled for less
than full compensation because the anticipated award is less than the
anticipated litigation cost. In these cases, the losses due to injury are
borne by the employees, and therefore are obviously not shifted to
the employer. If these are losses that should be borne by the employer, which is the assumption behind the workers' compensation system,
then it is appropriate to refer to them as externalized losses.
The second way in which litigation results in externalization of
losses is that the litigation costs of plaintiffs who pursue challenged
claims are generally not shifted to the employer. If the claim is valid,
the cost of pursuing it should be considered part of the loss resulting
from the initial injury." 1 In order to compensate the victim, this
cost should be shifted to the employer.
The third sense in which the costliness of litigation generates
accident cost externalization is that the administrative costs of litigating claims-the incremental costs of running the administrative machinery-are externalized to the public.
The first two sources of externalization, dropped claims and the
costs of litigated claims, stand in the way of shifting the injury losses
associated with workplace accidents. Because these losses are not
shifted to the employer, the employer will have less incentive to
invest in safety than in a regime in which all losses were fully shifted. It is impossible to measure the impact of these sources of externalization because there is very little worthwhile data in this area. To
gain some idea of the possible importance of these obstacles to inter-

230. Id. This may be a deceptive figure, however, since many claims in Alabama find
their way into the courts. Court costs are not accounted for under the W.C.D. budget.
231. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, The Real Torts Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIo ST.
LJ. 443 (1987); Hylton, Influence of Litigation Costs, supra note 80.
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nalization, consider the following simulation.
Suppose the losses that occur as the result of workplace injuries
are distributed randomly and suppose the probability distribution is
given by the first order exponential function H(z) = 1 - exp[-tzJ,
where 11T is equal to the expected value of the random variable z.
The shape of the distribution of losses is shown in Figure 2(a). Studies of accident claims report distributions that are similar to that
shown in the figure. 2 If the cost of litigating is fixed and equal to
$300, all claims within the shaded area of Figure 2(a) will be
dropped. Because these losses are not shifted to the employer, these
claims make up part of what we refer to as the externalized injury
losses. The other source of externalized injury losses consists of the
litigation costs of plaintiffs who pursue challenged claims.
Define the ratio of externalized losses to the expected loss as
follows: Ratio = (Expected externalized loss) / (Expected loss) where
the expected externalized loss is given by the following expression:
Prob(Claim dropped) x (Expected loss, given claim dropped) +
Prob(Claim not dropped) x (Expected loss, given claim not dropped).
The expected loss, given that the plaintiff's claim is not dropped
is the plaintiff's cost of litigating, provided that the plaintiff's injury
is fully compensated. If the injury is not fully compensated, then the
expected loss, given that the claim is not dropped, is equal to the
plaintiff's litigation cost plus the extent to which the loss is under
compensated. We will assume for simplicity that the loss is fully
compensated in this section. Thus, if V is the plaintiff's loss (which
is a random variable), E(V) the expected loss, and Cv the plaintiff's
cost of litigating, the expected externalized loss is: Prob(Claim
dropped) x [E(VIV<Cv)] + Prob(Claim not dropped) x (Cv) where
E(QPV<Cv) is the expected value of V given that V is less than Cv.
Under the assumptions just stated, the claim will be dropped if V
< Cv. Note that the expression for the expected externalized loss is:
H(Cv)E(PjV<Cv) + [1-H(Cv)JCv. Substituting the first order exponential . function, it is straightforward to show that Ratio
= 1 - exp{-Cv/E(V)]. We will use this in the simulation as a measure
of the degree to which losses are externalized because of costly litiga-

232. Se4 e.g., AUXRED F. CONARD ET AL, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN ThE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION 137-52 (1964). Of course, the
reported distributions are =censored" because they capture only those claims that were not
dropped. But censoring of this sort should not greatly change the shape of the distribution
from its uncensored version.
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tion. The index of externalization is reported in Figure 2(b) for different levels of the ratio of plaintiff's litigation expenses to the average
injury loss. The table in Figure 2(b) shows that when the cost to the
plaintiff of litigating is one-half of the average injury loss, roughly
forty percent of injury losses will be externalized. When the
plaintiffs cost is twice the average injury loss, eighty-six percent of
injury losses will be externalized.
The simulation demonstrates that litigation costs can be a significant obstacle to loss-shifting, even if the plaintiff's costs are less than
half of the average injury loss. Of course, the real average injury loss
is never observed because we see only the claims that are filed and
not dropped. The losses that are either never filed or dropped after
being contested are likely to be small. If we were to find an accurate
measure of average injury loss in a given category of injury, it is
quite plausible that it might be roughly equal to the plaintiff's average cost of litigating the claim.
Let us consider a concrete example. Recall that the plaintiff's
litigation expenses amounted to twenty-five percent of the average
claim in Texas and in Wisconsin. The average claim is an
upward-biased measure of the average injury loss because it does not
reflect claims that are dropped. If the bias is small enough to be
ignored, we can use the average claim to approximate the average
injury loss, and in this case Figure 2(b) would imply that twenty-two
percent of injury losses are externalized. We can therefore take
twenty-two percent as a lower bound on the extent of injury loss
externalization that results solely from the litigation of contested
claims in Texas and in Wisconsin. If the bias is so substantial that
the average claim is twice the average injury loss, then Figure 2(b)
implies that forty percent of injury losses would be externalized. Finally, it should be recognized that externalized losses should be increased by the state's average cost of processing a dispute, since this
is cost imposed on the public by each contested claim. This is fairly
high in both Texas and Wisconsin, on the order of $500 to $1,000.
However, there is not enough information on the state's average injury loss to say how taking this figure into account would affect the
estimate of the ratio of externalization.
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Probability
of Loss

Loss

$300
FIGURE 2(a)

Simulation of Loss Externalization
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0

Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
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1/4
1/2
3/4

= 0.00
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

0.22
0.39**
0.53
0.63
0.78
0.86
0.92
0.95

E(V) = average injury loss, Cv = plaintiff's litigation costs
If cost of litigation for plaintiff is 1/2 average damage claim,
then 39% of injury losses will be externalized.
FIGURE 2(b)
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5. Special Funds and Externalization
States have created a handful of special state managed funds
designed to move the costliest claims to the edges of the system, i.e.,
into the hands of the state and out of the hands of business and the
insurance industry.3 These reforms were adopted primarily as a
way of assuring protection to particular classes of disabled workers
while reducing costs to business.
Several types of special funds can be identified. Second injury
funds were introduced earlier than any of the other types of special
funds, and are in place in every jurisdiction in the United States.2
They were designed to encourage employers to hire disabled workers.3 5 If a workplace accident serves to worsen an already existing
disability, the employer is only required to pay the cost of the injury
which would have resulted had the worker not been suffering from a
pre-existing condition.' Additional expenses are paid out of the
state second-injury fund. 7 For example, if a worker already suffered from blindness in one eye, and lost sight in his other eye following an on-the-job accident, the employer would only be held
responsible for the award associated with partial blindness. The state
would make up the difference. In the particular case of second-injury
funds, two ideas are being given expression: (1) the state should provide incentives to ensure that employers hire the disabled, and (2)
employers should not be held liable for expenses that do not directly
result from work place accidents.
Other types of state managed funds include: (1) funds to provide
for the expenses associated with extended hospital care, (2) funds to
support rehabilitation expenses, (3) funds to provide cost-of-living
adjustments to permanently disabled workers, (4) funds to provide
continuing benefits to workers when an insurer (or a self insuring
employer) fails financially and can no longer provide support, and (5)
funds to pay benefits to workers injured while employed in particular
high risk industries.3 One difficulty with all of these funds is the

233. Lloyd W. Larson & John F. Burton, Jr., Special Funds in Workers' Compensation,
in WoRKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS: ADEQUACY,

(John D.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

EQUITY, AND EFFICIENcY 117, 118-21

Worrall & David Appel eds., 1985).
Id. at 122-35.
Id. at 123.
Id,
Id.
Id at 121-22.
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following: too often, arrangements in place for financing special state
funds are insufficient to the task. Many states demand that employers
or insurers pay into these funds some fixed amount in cases where an
employee without dependents dies in a work-related accident. The
amount contributed by employers/insurers per case varies from state
to state. In Alabama, employers/insurers need to contribute only $100
in each no-dependency death case, while in Texas the figure can be
as great as $85,680. 2 9 Arrangements which link employer/insurer
contributions to no-dependency death cases carry with them an important failing: few industrial accidents result in death, and even fewer
involve workers without dependents. 240 In short, it is difficult to finance a second-injury fund (or any other type of special fund) exclusively with contributions drawn from no-dependency death cases.
This is especially true in states like Alabama, which demand such a
small payment in such cases.241 Because such arrangements are so
obviously ill-suited to provide sufficient funds, additional funding
strategies are put into place. The result is a cut-and-paste funding
strategy replete with holes. Employees can find that while employers
have been relieved of the responsibility to provide compensation, the
state is unprepared to deliver benefits in their place.
If workers' compensation arrangements are designed to help
internalize accident costs, state managed special funds too often serve
to overturn this effort. In the first place, there is no guarantee that
employers responsible for workers' injuries are actually being required
to contribute to the state funds. Some states suspend employers' contributions whenever the fund rises above a particular statutorily fixed
level.242 In seeking to supplement the meager sums collected in
no-dependency death cases, some states collect from each employer
(or insurer) a sum determined by a fixed percentage of all benefit
payments made.243 For example, Montana requires each employer to
contribute to the state fund an amount equal to five percent of all

239.

U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1989 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS

38-41 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 ANALYSIS].
240. Larson & Burton, supra note 233, at 129.
241. Id at 135.
242. Id at 152-53. For example, Iowa only forces employers to contribute to its secondinjury fund if the fund falls below $50,000. Because state authorities invest the monies they
collect in these special funds, it may be that returns from investments often work to boost
the resource total above the minimum, reducing the need to collect payments from employers.
In any event, the practice of pursuing returns from investments, while practical, would seem
to violate simple notions of enterprise liability.
243. Id.
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benefits paid by the employer during the previous year.2 Or, as an
example, an employer who paid out $1,000 in compensation benefits
in 1990 would be required to contribute $50 to the state fund. Many
states adopt this approach, with certain differences from program to
program.24 In some states, assessments are made only on certain
types of disability payments. Other states place an assessment on
insurance premiums. Louisiana, for one, demands from insurers an
amount equal to one percent of all premiums collected.2 1 Of
course, insurers pass on this cost (or at least some portion of it) to
employers. However, some types of funds-principally those devoted
to the payment of benefits to workers injured while employed in
specific high risk industries covered by special arrangements-draw a
great majority of their contributions from employers which have no
connection whatsoever with the industry within which the injuries
occur. For example, Alaska has a special fund designed to provide
workers injured in the fishing industry with compensation.247 In
some cases, the fund is not created exclusively with contributions
from boat owners, loggers, or processing factories, but instead draws
contributions from all types of businesses working in the state. As a
result, disabled workers who draw benefits from the fund will not be
deriving their compensation exclusively, or even primarily from the
industry "responsible" for their injuries.
Similar concerns can be attached to funds created by states to
provide insurance to employers unable to secure affordable protection
through the market and to funds designed to pick up benefit payments to disabled workers when an insurer or a self-insured employer

244. See ADMINIShATION PROFILES, supra note 134, at 215; see also Larson & Burton,
supra note 233, at 153.
245. Larson & Burton, supra note 233, at 152-53. Financing arrangements similar to
those of Montana are in place in Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Migsouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South
Dakota. Id
246. Id at 152. Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana (as
mentioned), Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode

Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia all finance their funds this way.
247. See ADMINISTRATON PROFILES, supra note 134, at 9. Other states offer similar
funds for specific, high risk industries. Ohio also offers a marine workers' fund. Michigan
extends protection to workers employed in logging. Ohio and West Virginia offer special
protection to coal miners. Several states offer special protection for workers suffering from

diseases associated with exposure to asbestos. In each instance the motivation is clear: the
state is intervening to assure that important industries which might not be able to get affordable insurance are assured protection. In each of the preceding examples, the industry covered
enjoys an important status, and the work is extremely hazardous. Id. at 192, 293, 409.
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is brought down by financial failure.248 With reference to
state-provided, low-cost insurance protection, the state steps forward
to offer less costly options to employers whose safety records prevent
private insurers from extending affordable premiums. If the premiums
being offered by the private insurance market are appropriate to the
manufacturer's loss experience, the cheaper fees offered by the state
will necessarily fail to shift to the employer all accident costs. The
gap will be filled by reserves in the state fund, which is financed by
contributions from all employers/insurers, not simply those who practice high-risk operations. Moreover, all administrative costs attached
to the distribution of benefits will be carried by the state. The concerns attached to state funds created to deliver benefit payments to
disabled workers when an insurer or a self-insured employer is
brought down by financial failure are even more straightforward. In
this case, all costs are shifted to the state's special fund, which is, of

course, maintained by contributions from other, presumably more
financially responsible, employers and insurers.
One of the main ideas behind these funds is to allow particular
classes of employers to share the burden of meeting certain types of
costly compensation-not to relieve them entirely of that burden.
However, in some cases employers may be entirely relieved of contributing. Moreover, since the administrative costs of dispensing these
benefits often are carried by the state, these expenses-ordinarily
shouldered by insurers and passed on to employers through service
fees-are wholly externalized. Another peculiar twist in the story is
that these special funds were created, at least in part, out of a desire
to avoid unnecessary delays (and associated costs) linked to repeated
employer challenges. Many of these state managed funds are designed
to provide benefits to workers bringing forward unusually costly
claims. By creating special funds to provide for the payment of benefits for specific types of costly disabilities, states hope to reduce the
number of employer challenges. Unfortunately, in order to do so, the
state must create new administrative instruments to oversee the state
managed funds and distribute benefits, and this, of course, carries a
significant cost.
To sum up, special funds generally lead to two types of accident
cost externalization. The first is the externalization of injury losses,
which results when the injury losses are not borne entirely by the

248. Most states have such standards. See Larson & Burton, supra note 233, at 118-22.
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employer. The second is the generation of additional administrative
costs, which are borne by the public. Thes are essentially the same
types of externalization generated by the costliness of litigation. However, the first type of externalization is more worrisome in the case
of the special funds because the losses are shifted to the industry or
general public. In the case of litigation, most of the injury losses that
are not shifted to the employer are borne by the employee. In the
case of the special funds, some of the injury losses are shifted away
from both parties. This is a more worrisome type of externalization
because it removes all incentives from the responsible parties to take
injury losses into account.
A further problem with externalization caused by special funds is
noticed once competition in the insurance industry is taken into account. The guaranty funds are similar to federal deposit insurance in
the banking sector in the sense that they eliminate one class of creditor-customers of the insurance company-that will be seeking to

have their claims honored if the insurance company goes bankrupt.
To the extent that this reduces the downside -risk of competition,
insurance firms are given an incentive to underprice their policies and
to take on additional risk. Reputational concerns will prevent some insurers, notably larger firms, from taking full advantage of this incentive to take on additional risk, but small insurers will be vulnerable to
these incentives.

6. Undervaluation and Undercompensation
a. Compensable Losses
The gap between what a worker is actually due-as measured by
his or her losses-and what a worker actually receives in benefits is
difficult to describe with certainty. What should be counted as a
compensable loss? Surely forfeited wages should be included. It
seems evident that one should count as compensable losses all medical expenses directly associated with the on-the-job injury. Beyond
this, the issue becomes less easily resolved. How should an arbitrator
measure lost earning capacity when calculating permanent partial
disability benefits? The "whole man" approach-whereby a disability
is evaluated according to the resultant diminishment from total
well-being-is imprecise.249 Additionally, should one count among
249. Nevada provides a good example of this approach. In Nevada, a worker suffering
from a hand injury, for example, might be determined to be suffering from an impairment of

ten percent (or perhaps less, if the worker is right-handed and the injury is to his left hand).
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losses the series of raises a typical worker could expect through the
course of his or her working life as he or she is promoted to better
positions within the company? What of the loss of employer provided
fringe-benefits? What obligation does an employer owe a child who
has lost his father to a work related accident? Should the child be
assured the opportunity to complete a college education? Equally
difficult to measure are the costs of emotional injury and mental
anguish. A second set of concerns is generated by the problem of
measuring undercompensation. One can find in the workers' compensation field isolated examples where individual cases result in awards
which surpass the judgments handed down in tort cases involving
similar injuries. Should this lead one to conclude that in these particular cases the worker is over-compensated?
State laws distinguish between duration of disability and degree
of disability. It seems convenient to think of disability awards as the
product of a calculation based on the following two by two diagram:
Duration
Temporary

Permanent

Temporary Total

Permanent Total

Total

Temporary Partial

Permanent Partial

Partial

Degree

FIGURE 3

Not placed on this table are benefits paid to surviving spouses who
have lost partners due to work place accidents. A fair number of
states offer lifetime benefits (generally 66 2/3% of worker's wage) to
surviving spouses, and seek to offer some type of payment for the
educational costs of surviving children.'
In most states, benefits
stop when a surviving spouse remarries (although some states allow

That is, compared to the "whole man, this worker has been diminished by ten percent
Nevada calculates permanent partial disability benefits in the following fashion: for each one
percent of impairment, the worker is provided with a monthly payment equal to 0.6% of his
monthly wage. The payments are limited to a five year period. In this case, therefore, the
worker would be provided with six percent of his ordinary monthly wage for a period of
five years (that is, 10 x 0.6%). See STATE COMPENSATION, supra note 125, at tbl. 8.
250. See id at tbl. 12.
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support for a child's educational expenses). 51 Because lifetime benefits of this sort are potentially costly, employers work to encourage
the introduction of limits. Pressure from business directly encouraged
the 1977 revisions of amendments adopted in Illinois in 1975 which

substantially increased death benefits. 2 There are limitations in
place which reduce the level of death benefits a surviving spouse can
collect. Every state imposes a limitation on burial expenses. 3 This
limit is usually stated as a specific dollar amount, but some states fix
the maximum allowance through more complicated means.' As a
standard, however, burial allowances generally range from around
$1,000 to as high as $6,000.2 With regard to benefits paid to surviving spouses, there is some diversity in the ways limitations are
set.2 6 Many states do not set limits. 7 Among those which do offer limits, some states benefits off after a specified number of
weeks, 58 while others impose fixed dollar limits,
and still others combine these approaches.W
Returning to Figure 3, a temporary total ("TT") disability finding
would result from an injury of a type which is sufficiently extensive
as to keep a worker off the shop floor entirely-and thus prohibit
him or her from earning wages-for a limited duration. On the other
hand, as a general standard, workers who demonstrate that a work
related injury has permanently "rendered them unable to engage in
substantially remunerative employment" are qualified to receive permanent total ("PT") disability benefits.26 In most cases, benefits in
PT cases end when unexpected recovery allows claimants to return to

251.

See id

252. See, e.g., John Elmer & James String, Showdown Ahead on Workmen's Aa4 Ci.
TRDB., Apr. 11, 1976, § 2, at 16.
253. See STATE COMPENSATION, supra note 125, at tbl. 13.
254. See 1990 ANALYsIs, supra note 206, at 24-25.
255. See STATE COMPENSATION, supra note 125, at tbl. 13.
256. Nearly every state stops benefits when the surviving spouse remarries (in some cases
the state offers a final lump sum settlement). Id. at tbl. 12. Also, it should be pointed out
that most states set different limits for spouses without children, and for those with children.
See &L
257. Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia do not. Id.
258. Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Im
259. California, Florida, Kansas, North Dakota, and Tennessee. Id.
260. Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, and Mississippi. Id.
261. JEFFREY V. NAcKLEY, PRIMER ON WoRKERs" COMPENSATION 42 (1987).
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the work force, or the disabled worker dies. In some jurisdictions,
workers who are totally blinded or lose two limbs are eligible by
statute to receive PT benefits, whether they return to some form of
employment or not.'
The category of temporary partial disabilities-although making
an appearance in our two-by-two table-infrequently receives mention
in the literature. It may well describe the largest number of work
related injuries. The reason temporary partial disabilities are so frequently ignored by analysts is that in many cases, temporarily partially injured workers do not miss any work and, as a result, do not
surrender wages. Consider an example. An assembly line worker,
normally responsible for lifting sections of metal trim for placement
on car doors, strains her back on the job. The worker visits the shop
physician, who gives her a pain killer and a muscle relaxant and,
with the agreement of the worker's supervisor, assigns her to perform
lighter tasks for the remainder of the week. The following Monday,
the worker is back at her normal station without missing a day of
work. No wages were lost and, as a result, the employer does not
need to offer any compensation payments (although the cost of treatment was, of course, carried by the plant or the worker's health
plan).
The last category, permanent partial ("PP") disabilities, is complicated because there are two approaches to the delivery of benefits:
scheduled and non-scheduled. 2" Both scheduled and non-scheduled
awards are provided to permanently partially disabled workers. Scheduled awards are generally offered to workers who suffer specific
permanent partial disabilities, such as the loss of a limb, or the loss
of hearing in an ear. The worker is provided with a standardized
benefit package, drawn from a statutorily fixed benefit schedule.2"
Scheduled awards are often presented in a single lump-sum payment. ' Non-scheduled awards, on the other hand, allow a disabled
worker to collect an on-going weekly benefit which is calculated with
reference to the worker's weekly wage at the time of injury.2"
Non-scheduled awards are provided in cases of temporary disability,
in cases of permanent total disability, and for injuries which result in

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

l.
Id at 45-48; STATE COMPENSATION, supra note 125, at tbl. 9(a).
NACKLEY, supra hote 261, at 45.
Id at 47.
Id. at 162.
See STATE COMPENSATION, supra note 125, at tbl. 8.
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permanent partial disabilities that fail to fall under the several categories of impairment established-by statute.2m
Permanent Partial awards are often paid whether or not an injured worker actually details a prospect of lost wages.' However,
in many cases, it would seem that state officials are attempting to
calculate the average expected wage loss associated with a particular
type of impairment.' State industrial accident boards want to provide compensation, and close each case, without the delay that would
be associated with a long-term review of an injured worker's actual
post-injury wage profile. Accordingly, in each case a medical evaluation provides an estimation of the degree of impairment, with an
understood assumption that impairment levels carry certain expectations about work place disability. Scheduled awards for the loss of a
limb, loss of an eye, hearing loss, or disfigurement, come the closest
to actual "impairment" awards. In most states, victims of occupational
injuries can secure payment of scheduled benefits while at the same
time receiving other types of compensation benefits (i.e., temporary
total disability benefits) or while continuing to earn a wage.271 In
addition to awards for the actual loss of the limb, many states also
provide for injured workers to receive artificial limbs (and training in
their use) as a part of their medical award.2"
There is a great variety in the dollar amounts provided for in
states' scheduled awards. As a standard, scheduled awards are calculated according to the following formula. Each type of disability
included under the schedule27 is linked with a statutorily fixed
number of weeks. The benefit is determined by multiplying some
portion of the injured worker's weekly wage (in most states
two-thirds of the weekly wage) by the specific number of weeks
demanded by the law. As an example, an injured worker in Alabama
who makes $180 a week could expect to collect $26,640 for the loss
of an arm.274 There are, in nearly every state, maximum award lev-

268. See id
269. NACKLEY, supra note 261, at 45.
270. Id. at 47.
271. Id at tbl. 9(b); see also NACKLEY, supra note 261, at 48. This is true in Illinois.
See Illinois Workers' Compensation Act § 8(0, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.8(f)
(Smith-Hurd 1986).
272. NACKLEY, supra note 261, at 51.
273. In most states scheduled injuries include the loss of an arm, a hand, a thumb, a
finger, a leg, a foot, a toe, or an eye, and the loss of hearing in one or both ears. See
STATE COMPENSATION, supra note 125, at thl. 9(a).

274. Id. at tbls. 8, 9(a). This is calculated by multiplying $120 (two-thirds of the
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els set in law for each type of scheduled injury. In Alabama, for
example, the maximum award for the loss of an arm is $48,840.275
Measured by after-tax income, temporarily disabled workers are

not, as a group, severely under compensated. As a general accounting,
about seventy-five percent of all temporarily disabled claimants receiving benefits under a "typical" benefit scheme retain eighty to
one-hundred percent of their regular after-tax income.276 Many states
place statutorily fixed caps on the benefits available to temporarily
disabled workers, but, in most cases, these limits are set at relatively
generous levels.2'
More serious are limits placed on permanent disability payments.
It is difficult to evaluate the adequacy of PT awards. Such an evaluation would require setting a price on the loss of a limb. We will
focus, instead, on limits set on PT benefits.
Most states which cap PT disability payments situate the limitaa statutory restriction on the number of weeks a claimant
through
tion
can collect benefits.27' For example, suppose that the maximum
weekly disability payment allowed in Texas is $23879 Texas law

worker's weekly wage) by 222 weeks (the number of weeks indicated in the schedule).
275. Id. at tbl. 9(a). This is calculated on the basis of income figures for 1990.
276. KAREN P_ DEVOL, INCOME REPLACEMENT FOR SHORT-TERM DIsABILITY: THE ROLE
Op WoRKERS' COMPENSATION xi-xiii (1985). DeVol's "typical" system was the Massachusetts
system. Looking at other figures she provides, it seems that the Massachusetts system is, indeed, representative. Id at 52-57.
277. See STATE COMPENSATION, supra note 125, at tbL 6. New Mexico limits temporary
disability payments (and permanent total disability payments) to 700 weeks; Indiana, South

Carolina, and Virginia limit payments to 500 weeks (Indiana and South Carolina's arrangements also limit PT disability benefits); Arkansas and Mississippi limit to 450 weeks
(Mississippi's limit applies to PT benefits as well). Texas limits temporary benefits to 104
weeks (and PT benefits to 401 weeks); Missouri and New Jersey to 400 weeks; Florida to
260 weeks; Puerto Rico and Utah to 312 weeks; Oklahoma to 300 weeks; Massachusetts to
156 weeks; and West Virginia to 208 weeks. Idaho and Ohio offer reduced benefits after the
passage of a statutorily fixed period of time. Minnesota has a more complicated arrangement
which cuts off benefits ninety days after maximum improvement is made, or ninety days after
occupational retraining is completed. In most cases (but probably not all), workers exhausting
temporary benefits would be found to qualify for PT benefits-except, of course, in states
where temporary and PT benefits end at the same statutorily fixed point. See also 1989
ANALYSIS, supra note 239, at 18-29.
278. In addition to those states listed earlier which limit the duration of both PT and
temporary benefits (New Mexico, Indiana, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Texas), two states
limit only the duration of PT benefits: Tennessee and Wyoming. See 1989 ANALYSIS, supra
note 239, at 18-29.
279. This was the average weekly wage in the state, and the ceiling on weekly benefits,
in 1989. See id.
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limits the duration of PT benefits to 401 weeks. 2® Accordingly, a
disabled Texas worker can only expect to collect $95,438 in weekly
disability payments from his employer ($238 x 401 weeks). However,
this amount does not represent the total amount of compensation
possible. Workers could still collect payments for medical treatments
and rehabilitation services, and in cases where the worker has suffered the loss of a limb or an eye, for example, permanent partial
disability benefits will also be awarded. Limitations on the number of
weeks a disabled worker can draw benefits can be found in about
half the states in the nation. '
While temporary disability arrangements are intended to pay the
immediate expenses of medical care and sustain the worker until he

or she returns to work, permanent total disability benefits, as the
description suggests, are designed to provide continuing support to a

disabled worker whose injuries are so severe that a return to gainful
employment is precluded. Benefit limitations can be burdensome,
from the perspective of a permanently disabled worker. In New Mexico, for example, which limits PT benefits to 700 weeks, a worker

will exhaust his or her benefits in a little more than thirteen
years. 2' For a worker disabled early in his working life, say at age
thirty, weekly disability assistance can come to an end while the
claimant is in his mid-forties. The disabled worker's only alternative
in such cases remains a reliance upon Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") and similar support programs which offer less generous
benefit arrangements.
b. Inflation
Without inflation protection, permanent total disability benefits
will increasingly fall short of replacing lost income.2 83 Only a 2little
4
more than a dozen states offer automatic cost-of-living increases.
In two celebrated reports published in 1972 and 1974, federal
reviewers recommended that states adopt measures designed to allow
an annual cost of living adjustment to be paid to injured workers
receiving benefits under permanent total disability programs.2" At

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

ld.
See
See
See
See
See

Ud.

id. at 19.
Larson & Burton, supra note 233, at 13545.
io.at 156.
NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 170, at 64.65; WHITE PAPER ON
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present, only sixteen states have put in place measures offering automatic cost of living increases.
Two federally administered compensation programs also offer automatic cost of living increases, as
does the U.S. Virgin Islands. 7
There is some variety among the sixteen states which offer automatio cost of living adjustments to those receiving long-term disability
benefits. Some of the sixteen offer cost of living adjustments only to
those receiving permanent total disability benefits.2 Others offer
adjustments to several classes of beneficiaries: to workers receiving
temporary total disability benefits, to those receiving permanent total
disability benefits, and to surviving spouses receiving death benefits. 2 9 California alone offers adjustments only to those receiving

temporary total disability benefits-but only if the disability persists
290 Nearly all of these states adjust benefits
for more than two years.
29 1

upward once a year.

There seem to be two main reasons why additional states have
not adopted automatic cost of living measures. In the first place, there
are incentive effect concerns. If benefit levels are made to reflect
increase in the cost of living, some argue, injured workers will lack
2
incentives to follow rehabilitation programs and return to work. 1
Many injured workers might not enjoy automatic cost of living adjustments on the job; to offer greater inflation protection in a benefit
program might discourage an injured worker from returning to work.
On the other hand, any move which serves to increase benefit levels
might encourage workers to exercise less care in their daily efforts. If
disability benefits can nearly equal wages (and medical costs are
assured), a worker may more willingly risk partaking in potentially

WORKERS' COMPENSATION: A REPORT ON THE NEED FOR REFORM OF STATE WORKERS"
COMPENSATION 4-5 (1974); see also ALLAN H. HUNT, INFLATION PROfCTION FOR WORKERS"
COMPENSATION CLAIMANTS IN MICHIGAN 2-3 (1981).

286. These sixteen states are: California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, South
Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. See NACKLEY, supra note 128, at 18-20.
287. Id at 117-23.
288. Id at 18-20.

289. Id.
290. Id. at 18.
291. Id. at 18-20. The Virgin Islands is one notable exception; it adjusts benefits every

two years. New Hampshire is another exception; it adjusts benefits every three years.
A few other states offer other qualifications. For example, in Virginia those eligible
for Social Security benefits do not receive cost of living adjustments. In the District of
Columbia, cost of living adjustments are capped at five percent.
292. DARLING-HAMMOND & KNIESNER, supra note 167, at 20.
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dangerous work place activities.
Much more important as a reason inflation adjustments are not
more widely offered is the cost associated with offering such
protections. It has been estimated that a five percent annual cost of
living adjustment would require an increase of between 18.5 and 25
percent in indemnity payments by employers.29 Indeed, it is likely
that insurers will demand that employers' premiums be sufficient to
cover the cost of a greater than expected cost of living increase. The
financial burden of maintaining cost of living adjustments over a
period of many years would undoubtedly be considerable.
c.

Offsets

Also of some importance is the consideration of contributions to
income replacement made by other benefit programs. In the case of
temporary benefits, SSDI may play a small role. There is a five
month waiting period before SSDI benefits can begin, and in some
cases benefits may be delayed for even longer.294 Still, temporary
disabilities can be of a long duration, extending well beyond two
years in some cases.29 SSDI benefits may prove a more important
concern for workers suffering from permanent disability. While many
states impose upon disabled workers receiving SSDI some type of
offsetting reduction in compensation payments, a surprising number of
jurisdictions do not impose such limits.2 The combination of SSDI
and workers' compensation benefits can often boost income replacement levels to near one hundred percent-at least for temporarily
disabled workers. 2" Two approaches to the calculation of offsetting

293. KAREN R. DEVOL, INCOME REPLACEMENT FOR LONG-TERM DISABILrTY: THE ROLE
OF WoRKERS' COMPENSATION AND SSDI 66 (1986) [hereinafter DEVOL, LONG-TERM DISABILrrY]; see also HUNT, supra note 285, at 46 (citing a National Council on Compensation
Insurance figure which estimates a 41.6 percent increase in employer costs given a six
percent annual cost of living increase).
294. DEVOL, LONG-TERM DISABILITY, supra note 293, at 49.
295. See, for example, the case of James J. Scholl, whose multiple injuries entitled him
to 137 weeks of temporary disability benefits. 2 ILLINOIS INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DECISIONS
AND OPINIONS 1988 645-46 (1989).
296. See STATE COMPENSATION, supra note 125, at tbl. 17. Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island,
South Carolina (unless the injured worker is a member of the State National Guard), South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia seem to require no offsetting
reductions.
297. DEVOL, LONG-TERm DISABILITY, supra note 293, at 48. In some cases, DoVol
establishes that income replacement levels can exceed one-hundred percent. Federal law
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reductions can be identified. In some states, a dollar for dollar offset
is introduced, whereby the injured worker surrenders one dollar of
workers' compensation for each dollar of SSDI support provided.
Other states use a formula which positions workers' compensation
benefits at fifty percent of SSDI levels. 29' As an example, imagine
that a disabled worker is collecting $250 a week in SSDI benefits.
The state would allow the employer to reduce the worker's weekly
workers' compensation payment to $125. Of course, the employer
would still be required to pay all medical costs and rehabilitation
fees.
d. Summary
If the theory underlying workers' compensation is that worker
losses should be shifted or internalized to the employer, then work
place injury losses that are not compensable should be considered
external losses-and, at the least, non-compensable losses provide an
easy-to-identify upper limit on the amount of externalization under the
workers' compensation system. We have identified three potential
sources of externalization in this section: the definition of compensable loss, inflation, and offsetting reductions in employer payments.
The extent of externalization through undervaluation of compensable loss is difficult to determine because it is impossible to measure
accurately the value of a limb or the ability to work. However, if any
undervaluation occurs, it is through the maximum permanent disability
award levels set in the state statutes. The maximum award levels
weigh heaviest against high wage workers in industries in which
injuries occur frequently.
Similarly, evaluating externalization that results from inflation
also raises the problem of putting a price on total disability. However,
one solution to the incentive problem generated by indexation to
consumer prices is to index total disability payments to wage levels.
This would remove any windfall that might result because price inflation exceeded wage inflation, and at the same time preserve some of
the purchasing power of the stream of disability payments. This approach would also be consistent with the theory underlying the

requires a reduction in SSDI benefits if the combination of SSDI and workers' compensation
exceeds 80% of the pre-injury wage. However, as indicated earlier, the tax free nature of
both workers' compensation benefits and SSDI means that disabled workers can often replace
a greater percentage of their pre-injury take home pay.
298. See STATE COMPENSATION, supra note 125, at thl. 17.
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workers' compensation statutes: it is the injury to a worker's earning
power-injury to the worker as a worker-not injury to a worker's
consuming power that the statute seeks to provide compensation for
and to internalize to the employer.
Perhaps the clearest source of externalization is the offsetting
reduction. Offsetting reductions externalize losses by allowing the
employer/insurer to shift them to the taxpaying public.
7. Sources of Externalization and Potential Solutions
We have noted that there are a number of problems in determining whether any externalization of accident costs occurs under the
workers' compensation system. If employees are informed about the
risks of injury on the job, any losses that are not required to be compensated under the current system will nevertheless be compensated;
either informally, i.e., outside of the procedures set up by the compensation statutes, or implicitly in wage payments that compensate
employees for accepting additional risk.2 " Of course, if employees
were fully informed, the compensation statutes themselves would
provide no benefits that would not have been provided in ordinary
employment agreements.
We have therefore set out under the assumption that employees
are not fully informed about workplace hazards. Under this assumption, we can defend workers' compensation as a mechanism for internalizing accident costs to the party that is best-informed and most
likely to respond to incentives for safety, and that will generally be
the employer. Loss shifting provides the employer with incentives to
make all safety enhancing investments as long as the cost of investing
in safety is less than the value of the injury losses prevented.
We have identified several areas in which externalization of
injury losses is likely to occur under the workers' compensation system. Two of the potential areas were originally identified by Calabresi
in his critique of the tort system: insurance pricing, and the tax and
transfer system. Two new categories have been identified in this
Article: undercompensation and the litigation process. In the case of
workers' compensation, externalization through the tax and transfer
system occurs largely through the operation of the special funds and
as a result of the state statutes that allow employers to make reductions in compensation payments to offset SSDI payments. Externaliza-

299.

See, e.g., RIcHARD B. VIC OR Er AL, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORKPLACE

SAFETY: SOME LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC THEORY 30-31, 58-59 (1982).
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tion through undercompensation occurs through the statutorily fixed
maximum permanent disability awards, and the failure in most states
to index the maximum awards to some measure of inflation. Externalization through the litigation process occurs because it is costly to
bring suit, and bringing suit is required if the claim is contested by
the employer. The cost of litigation borne by the employee is like a
tax that eats away part of the compensation for injury losses. In cases
involving legitimate claims, the injured employee's cost of litigating
should be considered part of the injury suffered by the employee.
Although it is impossible to say whether insurance pricing is an
important source of externalization, we think the presumption should
be that it is not. First, the externalization effects of the regulation of
pricing and competition are generally unclear.' ° Second, market imperfections, such as the inability of insurers to accurately identify risk
categories, are not clearly important sources of externalization. Market
incentives should be sufficient in forcing insurance companies to
make every effort to price policies in ways that reflect the likelihood
of a claim being made. Experience rating is not perfect, but there are
reasons to think that it will never be (even in the absence of price
regulation) and that perfection should not even be the goal of
risk-based pricing. Rigorous experience rating may lead employers to
put pressure on employees to not report injuries. That experience
rating is not as widespread as theoretically possible may simply verify
that at some point its costs begin to outweigh its benefits.
Externalization that resilts from the operation of the special
funds and through undercompensation are potentially serious problems. But they are fairly easy problems to solve. The externalization
that occurs through the existence of special funds can be corrected
either by eliminating the special funds or by requiring the states that
operate the funds to levy fees that reflect the employer's charges
against the special funds. This would probably happen anyway if the
funds were run by private insurers.
The most troubling source of externalization is the litigation
process. Although empirical work needs to be done in this area, our
model simulation suggests that litigation could cause a substantial
share of externalization of injury losses. The troubling part of the
problem is that there is no apparent solution. If anything, the problem

300. Of course, in states in which insurance commissions hold prices below cost, accident
costs will be externalized. But we have argued that the general result of regulation is ambiguous.
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is likely to grow worse over time as injuries that are more difficult to
trace to the worksite enter the system.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has offered an alternative critique of externality
theory as a source of normative principles for tort law, and has examined workers' compensation in light of the critique. The (justifiably)
better known critique is that provided by Ronald Coase in his article
that stated the Coase theorem. The gist of Coase's argument is that
the theory of externalities is biased in favor of finding market failures. Coase demonstrated that the important question is whether transaction costs prevent parties from reaching agreements that minimize
the social costs of accidents.
The alternative critique provided here is an argument that we
refer to as the internalization paradox. It recognizes an inherent tension between the goal of full internalization and that of assessing the
validity of compensation claims. Assessing validity is costly and this
has several implications. Some claims will not be brought because the
victim's cost of proving validity will exceed the value of the claim.
In addition, any effort to reduce errors in the assessment process will
close out a larger number of claims. Few systems in existence make
any effort to fully shift the costs of assessing validity, and it is difficult to see how a system could do this with a high degree of success.
There are several potential sources of externalization in the
workers' compensation systems, and we have devoted several pages to
identifying them. It seems that the most troubling, because of its
potential size and because it seems to be unsolvable, is the litigation
of contested claims.
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